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ABSTRACT	  
	  
	   Due	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  global	  climate	  change,	  natural	  disasters	  such	  as	  hurricanes	  are	  increasing	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  intensity	  and	  frequency.	  During	  the	  record-­‐breaking	  hurricane	  season	  of	  2005,	  Hurricanes	  Katrina,	  Rita,	  and	  Wilma	  struck	  the	  U.	  S.	  Gulf	  Coast,	  affecting	  areas	  from	  Texas	  to	  Florida	  and	  causing	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  damage.	  This	  study	  examines	  the	  allocation	  of	  FEMA	  Public	  Assistance	  across	  the	  affected	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico	  states,	  what	  factors	  account	  for	  variation	  in	  in	  assistance	  allocation,	  what	  are	  the	  priorities	  for	  recovery	  among	  county	  leaders	  and	  what	  obstacles	  they	  have	  encountered	  since	  2005.	  This	  study	  includes	  136	  counties	  and	  seven	  independent	  variables.	  The	  analysis	  includes	  bivariate	  correlation	  and	  multiple	  regression	  analysis,	  and	  a	  brief	  survey	  that	  was	  sent	  out	  to	  the	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency	  Director	  in	  each	  county	  of	  the	  study	  area.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  level	  of	  damage	  and	  amount	  of	  poverty	  within	  a	  county	  were	  strong	  predictors	  of	  Public	  Assistance	  allocation.	  Debris	  Removal	  and	  Infrastructure	  projects	  were	  the	  highest	  overall	  priority	  for	  communities	  and	  the	  most	  common	  obstacle	  faced	  by	  the	  local	  government	  was	  difficulty	  in	  getting	  a	  firm	  commitment	  from	  FEMA	  regarding	  the	  eligibility	  of	  a	  project.	  These	  results	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  future	  disaster	  management	  that	  will	  face	  ever-­‐evolving	  risks.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
	   	  
1.1	  Problem	  Statement	   	  
	   Coastal	  areas	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  around	  the	  world	  are	  experiencing	  coastal	  hazards	  more	  frequently	  and	  at	  a	  higher	  cost.	  Economic	  losses	  from	  these	  coastal	  hazards,	  including	  storms	  and	  floods,	  are	  growing	  due	  to	  increases	  in	  the	  coastal	  populations	  and	  the	  value	  of	  human	  assets,	  especially	  in	  high-­‐income	  countries	  (Wilby	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  the	  economic	  costs	  of	  natural	  disasters	  in	  general	  has	  increased	  14-­‐fold	  globally	  since	  the	  1950s.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  alone,	  natural	  disasters	  cost	  government,	  insurance	  companies,	  and	  victims	  about	  $20	  billion	  a	  year.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  the	  costs	  of	  assets	  causing	  this	  rise	  in	  natural	  disaster-­‐related	  spending.	  The	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  hurricanes	  and	  other	  coastal	  hazards,	  such	  as	  flooding,	  are	  increasing	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  making	  the	  situation	  that	  much	  more	  severe.	  It	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic,	  hurricane	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  has	  been	  increasing	  since	  1995.	  During	  the	  hurricane	  season	  of	  2005	  alone,	  the	  records	  for	  number	  of	  named	  storms	  and	  number	  of	  hurricanes	  were	  exceeded,	  with	  27	  named	  storms,	  of	  which	  13	  became	  hurricanes	  (Masozera	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	   On	  August	  29,	  2005,	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  struck	  the	  coasts	  of	  Louisiana	  and	  Mississippi	  as	  a	  Category	  3	  hurricane.	  It	  affected	  about	  1.5	  million	  people	  across	  90,000	  square	  miles	  of	  the	  Gulf	  Coast	  including	  parts	  of	  Louisiana,	  Mississippi,	  and	  Alabama	  (GAO,	  2006).	  	  	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  Hurricanes	  Rita	  and	  Wilma	  followed	  in	  the	  months	  after	  and	  affected	  areas	  across	  the	  Gulf	  Coast	  from	  Texas	  to	  the	  Florida	  panhandle.	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  alone	  cost	  more	  money	  and	  took	  more	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lives	  than	  any	  other	  single	  storm	  in	  U.S.	  history.	  Probably	  the	  most	  highly	  affected	  city,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana	  experienced	  property	  damages	  estimated	  at	  $81	  billion	  (Herron	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  Losses	  were	  also	  great	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  impacts,	  which	  for	  Mississippi	  and	  Louisiana	  alone	  could	  exceed	  $150	  billion	  (Toldson	  et	  al.,	  2011).	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  Figure	  1.1	  Counties	  Included	  in	  this	  Study	  
	   The	  Public	  Assistance	  funding	  amount	  will	  be	  compared	  with	  levels	  of	  damage	  in	  the	  county/parish	  in	  terms	  of	  number	  of	  housing	  units	  severely	  damaged	  and	  other	  factors	  influencing	  the	  socioeconomic	  status	  and	  levels	  of	  social	  vulnerability	  and	  adaptive	  capacity	  within	  the	  population	  of	  the	  counties/parishes.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  to	  determine	  whether	  damage	  was	  the	  major	  factor	  affecting	  recovery	  fund	  distribution	  or	  if	  there	  are	  other	  factor(s)	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  an	  affect	  on	  who	  was	  able	  to	  get	  recovery	  funds	  from	  FEMA.	  Although	  the	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  program	  was	  also	  a	  major	  source	  of	  funding	  for	  those	  recovering	  from	  these	  hurricanes,	  those	  funds	  will	  not	  be	  included	  in	  this	  study.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  were	  administered	  through	  HUD	  and	  each	  individual	  state	  was	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able	  to	  distribute	  the	  funds	  according	  to	  their	  own	  set	  of	  requirements.	  This	  would	  make	  any	  quantitative	  analysis	  between	  states	  difficult.	  Although	  the	  FEMA	  Individuals	  and	  Housing	  Program	  (IHP)	  funds	  are	  targeted	  more	  toward	  individuals	  in	  disaster-­‐affected	  areas,	  this	  will	  not	  be	  used	  because	  the	  data	  for	  these	  funds	  is	  unavailable.	  	   A	  brief	  survey	  of	  county/parish	  officials	  is	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  what	  rebuilding	  activities	  were	  a	  top	  priority	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  those	  activities	  were	  successfully	  completed	  and	  what,	  if	  any,	  obstacles	  were	  faced	  by	  the	  county/parish	  government	  in	  getting	  recovery	  funds	  and	  carrying	  out	  the	  recovery	  process	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  where	  more	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  given	  in	  terms	  of	  planning	  for	  disasters	  in	  the	  future.	  If	  efforts	  can	  be	  targeted	  at	  those	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  these	  events,	  we	  can	  improve	  our	  overall	  disaster	  management.	  	  
1.3	  The	  2005	  Hurricane	  Season	  
1.3.1	  Disaster	  Response	  	   	  In	  response	  to	  the	  horrific	  hurricane	  season	  of	  2005,	  Congress	  appropriated	  almost	  $88	  billion	  through	  four	  emergency	  supplemental	  appropriations	  acts	  between	  August	  2005	  and	  June	  2006	  (GAO,	  2006).	  	  Under	  the	  Robert	  T.	  Stafford	  Disaster	  Relief	  and	  Emergency	  Assistance	  Act	  (Stafford	  Act),	  the	  Federal	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency	  (FEMA),	  which	  is	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  (DHS),	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  management	  of	  recovery	  efforts	  and	  funds	  within	  the	  federally	  declared	  disaster	  affected	  areas.	  The	  Stafford	  Act	  guides	  the	  process	  of	  disaster	  declaration	  and	  relief	  expenditures,	  which	  come	  from	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	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President’s	  Disaster	  Relief	  Fund	  (Garrett	  and	  Sobel,	  2003).	  The	  first	  emergency	  supplemental	  appropriation	  act	  was	  enacted	  four	  days	  after	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  struck	  land	  and	  provided	  $10	  billion.	  The	  second,	  enacted	  6	  days	  later,	  provided	  an	  additional	  $50	  billion	  to	  FEMA.	  However,	  in	  December	  of	  2005,	  Congress	  rescinded	  $23.4	  billion	  of	  the	  funds	  from	  FEMA	  and	  instead	  gave	  it	  to	  other	  agencies	  directly.	  Overall,	  $88	  billion	  were	  given	  out	  to	  23	  federal	  agencies	  by	  June	  2006	  (GAO,	  2006).	  	  	   Now,	  seven	  years	  later,	  FEMA’s	  performance	  in	  managing	  the	  recovery	  is	  widely	  considered	  inadequate.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  answer	  as	  to	  why	  this	  is	  so,	  although	  there	  have	  been	  several	  possible	  explanations	  presented.	  Some	  of	  these	  include	  the	  lack	  of	  communication	  between	  governments	  at	  various	  levels	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  preparation	  and	  coordination	  by	  FEMA	  as	  a	  whole	  (Herron	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Additional	  issues	  experienced	  by	  FEMA	  include	  financial	  fraud,	  which	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  the	  arrest	  of	  FEMA	  employees,	  and	  general	  mismanagement	  of	  federal	  money.	  This	  led	  to	  contracts	  awarded	  to	  inadequate	  and	  sometimes	  dangerous	  companies	  who	  were	  favored	  for	  one	  reason	  or	  another	  (Jurkiewicz,	  2009).	  Additionally,	  the	  director	  of	  FEMA	  at	  the	  time,	  Michael	  Brown,	  had	  very	  little	  experience	  in	  disaster	  management.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  just	  FEMA	  that	  poorly	  managed	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season.	  The	  state	  and	  local	  governments	  in	  the	  affected	  areas	  were	  ill	  prepared	  for	  such	  events.	  In	  many	  cases	  there	  were	  not	  adequate	  plans	  regarding	  transportation,	  housing,	  and	  law	  enforcement	  that	  such	  events	  require.	  These	  combined	  inadequacies	  led	  to	  the	  poor	  coordination	  and	  overall	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  recovery	  process	  as	  a	  whole	  (Roberts,	  2006).	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   There	  has	  also	  been	  evidence	  that	  politics	  possibly	  played	  a	  role	  in	  state	  and	  local	  government’s	  disaster	  management	  and	  ability	  in	  securing	  federal	  funds.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  when	  Mississippi	  and	  Louisiana	  are	  compared	  to	  one	  another	  in	  terms	  of	  damage	  and	  amount	  of	  money	  received	  from	  the	  federal	  government,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  Mississippi’s	  then-­‐Governor,	  Haley	  Barbour’s	  political	  ties	  in	  Washington	  (Waugh	  Jr.,	  2009).	  In	  Louisiana	  in	  particular,	  cultural	  and	  ethical	  conditions	  within	  the	  state	  and	  its	  government	  have	  also	  been	  cited	  as	  reasons	  why	  federal	  aid	  was	  lacking	  there	  (Jurkiewicz,	  2009).	  Political	  influences	  on	  FEMA	  fund	  allocation	  are	  nothing	  new,	  unfortunately.	  During	  the	  1990s,	  for	  example,	  disaster	  funds	  flowed	  in	  larger	  abundance	  to	  districts	  considered	  politically	  important	  due	  to	  an	  upcoming	  election	  for	  either	  the	  President	  or	  those	  on	  the	  FEMA	  oversight	  committee	  (Roberts,	  2006).	  	   Another	  major	  problem	  experienced	  by	  FEMA	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  accountability	  in	  their	  spending.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  (GAO)	  reported	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  misappropriation	  and	  abuse	  of	  funds	  was	  almost	  over	  $2	  billion	  (Boettke	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Also,	  despite	  the	  large	  amounts	  of	  money	  being	  sent	  out,	  there	  was	  no	  government-­‐wide	  process	  for	  gathering	  information	  from	  all	  the	  involved	  agencies	  regarding	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  spent,	  the	  location	  of	  the	  spending,	  or	  the	  purpose	  (Singer,	  2006).	  Even	  though	  Congress	  stipulated	  that	  weekly	  reports	  had	  to	  be	  made	  by	  FEMA	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  $88	  billion	  and	  progress	  in	  recovery,	  the	  information	  proved	  to	  be	  relatively	  useless	  since	  FEMA	  lacked	  information	  from	  the	  other	  22	  agencies	  that	  were	  currently	  handling	  federal	  disaster	  funds	  as	  well	  (GAO,	  2006).	  In	  addition,	  local	  officials	  experienced	  difficulties	  when	  attempting	  to	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complete	  recovery	  projects	  funded	  by	  FEMA.	  One	  specific	  problem	  experienced	  by	  many	  local	  governments	  was	  getting	  some	  projects	  initiated	  due	  to	  delays	  caused	  by	  the	  high	  turnover	  rate	  of	  FEMA	  staff.	  This	  would	  cause	  decisions	  to	  be	  reversed	  and	  other	  inconsistencies	  during	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  certain	  project	  was	  eligible	  for	  funding	  and	  for	  how	  much	  it	  would	  be	  eligible.	  Another	  was	  the	  inability	  of	  some	  localities	  to	  afford	  matching	  funds	  required	  by	  FEMA	  on	  longer-­‐term	  projects.	  The	  federal	  government	  would	  ultimately	  pay	  90%	  of	  the	  bill	  but	  the	  local	  government	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  remaining	  10%.	  As	  can	  be	  imagined,	  in	  some	  poorer	  areas,	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  money	  to	  pay	  that	  10%	  when	  the	  local	  government	  was	  struggling	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  storm	  itself	  (Singer,	  2006).	  	  Roberts	  (2006)	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  smaller,	  poorer	  states	  in	  general	  have	  more	  difficulty	  in	  dealing	  with	  their	  portion	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  responding	  to	  natural	  disasters,	  particularly	  those	  with	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  2005	  hurricanes.	  These	  larger	  events	  can	  completely	  overwhelm	  them.	  
1.3.2	  Affects	  on	  the	  Population	  	   The	  residents	  of	  affected	  areas	  were	  obviously	  negatively	  affected	  by	  the	  failures	  of	  FEMA	  as	  well.	  Besides	  experiencing	  delays	  in	  accruing	  recovery	  funds,	  some	  people	  displaced	  by	  the	  storms	  were	  faced	  with	  prolonged	  stays	  in	  inadequate	  temporary	  housing,	  some	  of	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  health	  threat	  due	  to	  formaldehyde	  exposure.	  Another	  possible	  health	  concern	  for	  these	  victims	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  health	  care	  and	  mental	  health	  care	  services	  available	  to	  them	  (Redlener,	  2008).	  The	  poor	  management	  of	  the	  FEMA	  funds	  caused	  vulnerable	  populations	  especially	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  adequately	  recover	  and	  get	  back	  on	  their	  feet.	  	  
	   8	  
	   This	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  considering	  the	  huge	  amount	  of	  money	  appropriated	  for	  disaster	  prevention	  and	  management	  following	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  terrorism	  following	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  led	  to	  institutional	  and	  administrative	  changes	  that	  may	  have	  influenced	  FEMA’s	  capability	  to	  respond	  to	  natural	  disasters.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  management	  of	  the	  hurricane	  events	  and	  the	  resulting	  recovery	  funds,	  there	  were	  also	  certain	  conditions	  that	  existed	  in	  areas	  of	  the	  Gulf	  Coast	  that	  exacerbated	  the	  already	  complex	  and	  severe	  situation	  following	  the	  hurricane	  season	  of	  2005.	  New	  Orleans,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  large	  city	  that	  sits	  below	  sea	  level,	  making	  it	  susceptible	  to	  flooding	  (Cutter	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Another	  factor	  that	  affected	  the	  severity	  of	  Katrina	  in	  New	  Orleans	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  “levee	  effect”	  in	  which	  the	  presence	  of	  levees	  causes	  more	  development	  in	  low-­‐lying,	  flood-­‐prone	  areas	  which	  are	  subsequently	  severely	  damaged	  when	  an	  event	  such	  as	  Katrina	  eventually	  occurs	  (Kates	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  Along	  with	  poor	  development	  locations,	  New	  Orleans,	  and	  other	  surrounding	  coastal	  areas,	  are	  at	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  risk	  of	  storm	  damages	  due	  to	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  wetlands,	  which	  would	  normally	  serve	  as	  natural	  buffers	  (Bullard	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Hooks	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  states	  that	  FEMA	  assistance	  proved	  to	  be	  particularly	  ineffective	  at	  helping	  those	  who	  were	  most	  affected	  and	  in	  need	  of	  assistance,	  financial	  or	  otherwise.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  low-­‐income	  families	  lack	  insurance	  and	  certain	  federal	  assistance	  programs	  require	  insurance	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  eligibility	  of	  the	  aid.	  Moreover,	  vulnerable	  populations	  saw	  a	  lagging	  recovery	  when	  compared	  to	  more	  affluent	  neighborhoods.	  In	  Biloxi,	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CHAPTER	  2:	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  AND	  BACKGROUND	  INFORMATION	  
2.1	  FEMA	  Disaster	  Management	  	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  recovery	  fund	  distribution	  following	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season	  resulted,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  also	  understand	  the	  history	  and	  process	  of	  FEMA	  disaster	  management.	  After	  a	  natural	  disaster	  event	  occurs,	  the	  governor	  of	  the	  affected	  state	  must	  formally	  request	  federal	  assistance	  from	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States	  if	  they	  feel	  that	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  State	  alone	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  handling	  the	  recovery.	  After	  the	  governor	  has	  submitted	  this	  request,	  FEMA	  officials	  meet	  with	  the	  State	  officials	  and	  create	  a	  Preliminary	  Disaster	  Report	  (PDR),	  which	  they	  then	  use	  to	  make	  a	  recommendation	  to	  the	  President	  regarding	  the	  state’s	  eligibility	  (CRS,	  2012).	  Once	  this	  has	  occurred,	  the	  President	  then	  must	  decide	  on	  the	  eligibility	  of	  the	  event	  for	  federal	  assistance.	  If	  it	  is	  determined	  to	  be	  eligible,	  the	  President	  declares	  the	  state	  a	  disaster	  area.	  Now	  that	  this	  declaration	  has	  been	  made,	  the	  state	  may	  receive	  federal	  assistance	  from	  FEMA.	  Normally	  these	  funds	  come	  from	  the	  Disaster	  Relief	  Fund	  (DRF)	  that	  receives	  money	  from	  Congress	  every	  year	  as	  part	  of	  the	  fiscal	  budget.	  In	  severe	  events	  that	  require	  large	  amounts	  of	  money,	  the	  amount	  of	  aid	  given	  out	  is	  determined	  by	  Congressional	  appropriations,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  for	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  (Garrett	  and	  Sobel,	  2003).	  As	  defined	  by	  FEMA,	  a	  major	  disaster	  is”…any	  natural	  catastrophe	  (including	  and	  hurricane,	  tornado,	  storm,	  high	  water,	  wind-­‐driven	  water,	  tidal	  wave,	  tsunami,	  earthquake,	  volcanic	  eruption,	  landslide,	  mudslide,	  snowstorm,	  or	  drought),	  or,	  regardless	  of	  cause,	  any	  fire,	  flood,	  or	  explosion,	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  President	  causes	  damage	  of	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sufficient	  severity	  and	  magnitude	  to	  warrant	  major	  disaster	  assistance	  under	  this	  chapter	  to	  supplement	  the	  efforts	  and	  available	  resources	  of	  states,	  local	  governments,	  and	  disaster	  relief	  organizations	  in	  alleviating	  the	  damage,	  loss,	  hardship,	  or	  suffering	  caused	  thereby.”	  The	  types	  of	  recipients	  eligible	  under	  this	  declaration	  are	  state	  and	  local	  governments,	  certain	  designated	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  and	  families	  or	  individuals.	  	  It	  may	  be	  used	  to	  repair	  or	  replace	  infrastructure,	  provide	  temporary	  housing,	  unemployment	  assistance,	  crisis	  counseling,	  and	  for	  other	  programs	  (CRS,	  2012).	  
2.1.1	  Public	  Assistance	  Program	  
	   The	  Public	  Assistance	  program	  is	  the	  largest	  single	  source	  of	  disaster	  funds	  available	  to	  disaster	  victims,	  followed	  by	  the	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  program	  which	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  HUD.	  To	  determine	  eligibility	  for	  Public	  Assistance	  funds,	  FEMA	  considers	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  storm	  and	  its	  impacts	  in	  terms	  of	  per	  capita	  impacts,	  insurance	  coverage,	  hazard	  mitigation	  measures,	  prior	  year	  disaster	  impacts,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Stafford	  Act	  is	  the	  best	  statute	  for	  the	  situation,	  or	  if	  another	  would	  better	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  affected	  areas.	  If	  it	  determined	  that	  an	  area	  has	  enough	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  affectively	  manage	  the	  recovery	  without	  federal	  aid,	  they	  will	  be	  denied	  disaster	  assistance	  in	  that	  case	  (CRS,	  2011).	  	   In	  order	  to	  receive	  money,	  an	  applicant	  must	  submit	  a	  Request	  for	  Public	  Assistance.	  This	  form	  simply	  identifies	  the	  applicant,	  general	  claim	  information,	  and	  opens	  the	  Case	  Management	  File	  that	  is	  used	  for	  managing	  the	  particular	  project.	  If	  an	  applicant	  is	  approved,	  the	  funds	  will	  be	  made	  available	  by	  FEMA	  to	  the	  grantee	  (the	  State)	  for	  use	  by	  the	  sub-­‐grantee	  (local	  government	  or	  organization).	  It	  should	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also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  state	  officials	  are	  the	  ones	  responsible	  for	  making	  decisions	  regarding	  how	  much	  money	  is	  sent	  to	  each	  location	  (Pike,	  2007).	  	  	   As	  can	  be	  imagined,	  this	  process	  can	  take	  a	  very	  long	  time	  as	  the	  decisions	  regarding	  funding	  are	  passed	  down	  step	  by	  step.	  The	  lag	  time	  in	  recovery	  expenditure	  by	  FEMA	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  loudest	  complaints	  following	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season.	  For	  example,	  Figure	  2.1	  shows	  the	  approved	  amount	  of	  money	  for	  both	  the	  PA	  program	  and	  the	  CDGB	  program	  within	  Mississippi	  and	  Louisiana	  compared	  to	  the	  amount	  that	  had	  actually	  been	  spent	  as	  of	  August	  2007.	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Pike,	  2007.	  Figure	  2.1	  PA	  and	  CDBG	  Funds	  Approved	  and	  Spent	  as	  of	  August	  2007	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   As	  of	  two	  years	  after	  the	  hurricanes	  occurred,	  only	  about	  $4	  Billion	  of	  the	  approved	  $7	  Billion	  in	  PA	  funding	  had	  been	  spent.	  Additionally,	  when	  states	  are	  worried	  about	  having	  enough	  money	  to	  cover	  their	  rebuilding	  projects,	  they	  can	  set	  aside	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  CDBG	  funding	  to	  insure	  they	  will	  have	  enough	  money.	  This	  takes	  away	  from	  the	  money	  that	  could	  otherwise	  be	  available	  to	  help	  individuals	  with	  their	  housing	  needs	  (Pike,	  2007).	  This	  clearly	  points	  out	  the	  need	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  disaster	  aid	  funding	  process	  within	  FEMA.	  
2.1.2	  History	  of	  FEMA	  Disaster	  Management	  	   Following	  the	  hurricanes	  of	  the	  2005	  season,	  some	  held	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  overall	  management	  of	  the	  response	  by	  FEMA	  was	  inadequate.	  	  Although	  FEMA’s	  budget	  was	  larger	  than	  it	  had	  ever	  been,	  changes	  that	  had	  been	  made	  to	  the	  agency	  following	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks	  are	  thought	  to	  have	  hindered	  its	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  natural	  disasters,	  particularly	  very	  large	  ones	  such	  as	  Katrina.	  These	  changes	  included	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security,	  the	  Homeland	  Security	  Act	  of	  2002,	  and	  certain	  management	  frameworks	  for	  disaster	  events	  (Tierney,	  2012).	  	  Historically,	  FEMA	  does	  not	  handle	  so	  many	  complex	  responsibilities	  very	  well.	  Prior	  to	  the	  reorganization	  of	  FEMA	  following	  Hurricane	  Andrew	  in	  the	  1990s,	  FEMA	  had	  a	  similar	  problem.	  The	  agency	  suffered	  because	  it	  was	  responsible	  for	  terrorist	  attacks	  as	  well	  as	  the	  more	  common	  fires,	  hurricanes,	  tornadoes	  and	  other	  storms,	  and	  man-­‐made	  disasters	  such	  as	  chemical	  and	  oil	  spills.	  FEMA	  lacks	  the	  resources	  to	  adequately	  handle	  too	  many	  areas	  of	  disaster	  preparation	  and	  does	  better	  if	  focused	  only	  on	  natural	  disasters	  (Roberts,	  2006).	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2.1.3	  Post-­‐2005	  Changes	  	   There	  have	  been	  a	  few	  amendments	  to	  FEMA	  and	  the	  Stafford	  Act	  in	  the	  years	  since	  2005,	  no	  doubt	  due	  to	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  criticism	  the	  agency	  received.	  The	  109th	  Congress,	  which	  took	  office	  in	  2006,	  conducted	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  response	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  what	  caused	  the	  mismanagement	  and	  what	  improvements	  could	  be	  made	  for	  the	  future.	  Basically	  these	  amendments	  made	  the	  following	  changes:	  accelerated	  federal	  aid,	  provided	  provisions	  for	  helping	  those	  with	  special	  needs,	  expanded	  the	  disaster	  assistance	  to	  include	  transportation,	  expanded	  the	  federal	  housing	  assistance	  available	  to	  victims,	  allowed	  Public	  Assistance	  funding	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  facilities	  regardless	  of	  soil	  conditions	  (previously,	  it	  was	  only	  allowed	  for	  facilities	  in	  unstable	  soil),	  and	  required	  the	  President	  to	  designate	  a	  Small	  State	  and	  Rural	  advocate	  within	  FEMA.	  These	  changes	  were	  all	  made	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  response	  to	  the	  2005	  storms	  (CRS,	  2011).	  	  
2.2	  Politics	  and	  Disasters	  	   There	  has	  been	  some	  research	  on	  how	  politics	  can	  influence	  the	  recovery	  process	  following	  a	  disaster.	  In	  Louisiana,	  the	  political	  culture	  of	  the	  state	  has	  been	  blamed	  for	  the	  lagging	  recovery	  from	  the	  2005	  hurricanes.	  Also,	  ethical	  issues	  faced	  within	  the	  State	  administration	  combined	  with	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  state	  hindered	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  State	  to	  successfully	  attain	  recovery	  dollars,	  re-­‐develop	  damaged	  areas,	  and	  gain	  investments.	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  related	  research	  that	  the	  political	  corruption	  resulting	  from	  misuse	  of	  disaster	  recovery	  dollars	  can	  lead	  to	  long-­‐term	  affects	  for	  the	  location	  where	  economic	  growth	  and	  investment	  is	  hindered	  (Boettke	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et	  al.,	  2007).	  When	  comparing	  Mississippi	  to	  Louisiana,	  one	  might	  expect	  similar	  recovery	  results	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  similarly	  affected	  by	  the	  storms.	  However,	  due	  to	  political	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  states,	  Mississippi	  fared	  much	  better	  than	  Louisiana	  in	  terms	  of	  Katrina	  recovery	  overall	  (Jurkiewicz,	  2009).	  The	  governor	  of	  Mississippi	  at	  the	  time,	  Haley	  Barbour,	  used	  his	  political	  ties	  to	  acquire	  more	  recovery	  funds	  for	  his	  state	  both	  from	  Washington	  and	  his	  fellow	  Republican	  governor,	  Jeb	  Bush,	  of	  Florida	  (Waugh	  Jr.,	  2009).	  	   Garrett	  and	  Sobel	  (2003)	  conducted	  a	  study	  of	  FEMA	  payments	  following	  disaster	  events.	  Their	  objective	  was	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  are	  political	  influences	  on	  FEMA	  and	  on	  Presidential	  disaster	  declarations.	  They	  found	  that	  there	  are	  political	  influences	  on	  Presidential	  disaster	  declarations,	  particularly	  during	  an	  election	  year.	  They	  also	  found	  that	  the	  Congressional	  oversight	  committee	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Stafford	  Act	  influences	  FEMA	  payments	  by	  sending	  money	  to	  their	  constituents	  more	  often	  than	  to	  areas	  they	  do	  not	  represent.	  Overall,	  the	  authors	  concluded	  that	  over	  half	  of	  all	  payments	  made	  by	  FEMA	  are	  done	  so	  for	  political	  reasons.	  This	  study,	  however,	  was	  conducted	  prior	  to	  the	  reorganization	  of	  FEMA	  that	  took	  place	  in	  2003	  wherein	  FEMA	  became	  a	  part	  of	  DHS.	  A	  later	  study	  by	  one	  of	  the	  same	  authors	  (Sobel	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  re-­‐examined	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  congressional	  influences	  on	  FEMA	  and	  found	  that	  post-­‐reorganization,	  but	  before	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  there	  seemed	  to	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  correlation	  between	  congressional	  oversight	  and	  FEMA	  aid	  payments.	  The	  authors	  stipulate	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  FEMA’s	  inclusion	  in	  DHS,	  which	  is	  a	  very	  large	  agency	  with	  a	  very	  large	  budget.	  Since	  FEMA	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  freestanding	  agency,	  there	  is	  less	  opportunity	  for	  direct	  influences	  by	  Congress	  due	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to	  the	  increased	  bureaucracy.	  Also,	  FEMA’s	  budget	  is	  roughly	  about	  10%	  of	  that	  of	  the	  DHS	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  are	  now	  other,	  easier	  ways	  to	  target	  geographic	  locations	  with	  political	  favors	  in	  the	  form	  of	  DHS	  expenditures.	  No	  substantive	  study	  has	  yet	  been	  conducted	  to	  examine	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  political	  influences	  on	  FEMA	  by	  Congressional	  Oversight	  Committees	  post-­‐2005.	  However,	  Sobel	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  reported	  that	  they	  performed	  a	  brief	  study	  using	  data	  taken	  from	  after	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  and	  still	  found	  no	  significant	  correlation	  between	  Congress	  members	  and	  FEMA	  aid	  payments.	  This	  is	  also	  attributed	  to	  the	  current	  structure	  of	  FEMA	  following	  the	  reorganization	  in	  2003.	  	   There	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  correlation	  between	  disaster	  recovery	  funds	  and	  political	  corruption.	  According	  to	  some,	  there	  is	  a	  clearly	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  recovery	  funds	  a	  government	  is	  awarded	  and	  the	  political	  corruption	  of	  that	  government.	  FEMA	  funds	  are	  particularly	  corruptive	  because	  of	  the	  hectic	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  are	  generally	  distributed.	  Oversight	  of	  the	  fund	  distribution	  and	  use	  can	  be	  a	  daunting	  task	  in	  such	  conditions	  and	  can	  easily	  be	  overlooked	  (Boettke	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
2.3	  Disasters	  and	  Vulnerability	   	  	   	  A	  term	  that	  is	  often	  agreed	  upon	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  resilience	  is	  vulnerability.	  In	  terms	  of	  natural	  disaster	  events,	  a	  community’s	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  disaster	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  event	  itself	  and	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  it	  occurs	  (Masozera	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Within	  the	  social	  science	  community,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  upon	  that	  major	  factors	  influencing	  social	  vulnerability	  include	  lack	  of	  resources,	  information,	  and	  technology,	  social	  capital,	  beliefs	  and	  customs,	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age,	  and	  infrastructure	  (Cutter,	  2003).	  Vulnerability	  to	  hazards	  is	  the	  amount	  of	  exposure	  a	  population	  faces	  to	  a	  certain	  hazard	  coupled	  with	  that	  population’s	  ability	  or	  inability	  to	  prepare	  for	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  hazardous	  event	  (Gulieria,	  2011).	  	  Vulnerability,	  when	  combined	  with	  low	  adaptive	  capacity,	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  community’s	  access	  to	  resources,	  technology,	  and	  wealth,	  their	  risk	  perceptions,	  social	  capital,	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  community,	  along	  with	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  local	  institutions	  responsible	  for	  warning	  of	  and	  planning	  for	  natural	  hazards.	  Another	  common	  cause	  of	  increased	  vulnerability	  within	  a	  community	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  institutional	  policies	  that	  are	  in	  place	  that	  may	  be	  discriminating	  against	  certain	  groups	  of	  people,	  although	  not	  necessarily	  with	  those	  intentions.	  Some	  policies,	  when	  enacted,	  can	  appear	  to	  be	  very	  fair	  to	  all	  people	  but,	  in	  actuality,	  disadvantage	  some	  groups	  with	  historically	  fewer	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal	  (Henkel	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Additionally,	  socially	  vulnerable	  populations	  tend	  to	  reside	  in	  more	  environmentally	  hazardous	  locations,	  have	  less	  insurance,	  and	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  implement	  actions	  that	  could	  generally	  better	  prepare	  them	  for	  a	  disaster	  event	  (Masozera	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  A	  stark	  example	  of	  how	  social	  vulnerability	  can	  directly	  impact	  how	  a	  natural	  disaster	  affects	  a	  community	  is	  New	  Orleans.	  Because	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  struck	  on	  August	  29,	  right	  before	  welfare	  and	  disability	  checks	  were	  due,	  many	  people	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  evacuate	  and	  therefore	  were	  left	  in	  the	  path	  of	  the	  storm	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves	  (Cutter	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	   	  Populations	  with	  more	  wealth,	  or	  otherwise	  greater	  access	  to	  resources,	  can	  better	  afford	  to	  take	  precautionary	  actions	  that	  will	  better	  prepare	  them	  for	  a	  natural	  disaster	  (Redlener,	  2008).	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  only	  relevant	  to	  the	  United	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States.	  Globally,	  disparities	  in	  income,	  political	  power,	  and	  gender	  equality	  create	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  manage	  when	  disasters	  occur	  (Tierney,	  2012).	  	  	   Coastal	  risks	  can	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  community’s	  inability	  to	  plan	  or	  lack	  of	  planning	  for	  disaster	  events.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  an	  event	  as	  unique	  as	  the	  hurricane	  season	  of	  2005,	  specifically	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  Besides	  the	  sheer	  magnitude	  of	  the	  storm,	  there	  was	  also	  an	  failure	  of	  governmental	  institutions	  set	  up	  to	  handle	  situations	  such	  as	  that	  (Boettke	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  storm	  itself	  is	  not	  only	  difficult	  to	  manage,	  but	  when	  there	  is	  an	  event	  of	  such	  great	  magnitude,	  the	  recovery	  process	  becomes	  complicated	  in	  terms	  of	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  adequate	  recovery	  and	  financing	  that	  recovery.	  	  
2.4	  Resilience	   	  	   Resilience	  in	  the	  face	  of	  disasters	  is	  becoming	  ever	  more	  important	  as	  global	  climate	  change	  and	  population	  growth	  cause	  natural	  hazards	  to	  not	  only	  occur	  more	  frequently	  but	  also	  affect	  many	  more	  people.	  In	  the	  literature,	  resilience	  is	  sometimes	  viewed	  as	  a	  three-­‐legged	  barstool.	  The	  first	  leg	  represents	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  institutions	  in	  place.	  The	  second	  leg	  represents	  the	  political	  and	  legal	  institutions	  in	  place.	  The	  third	  and	  final	  leg	  represents	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  in	  place.	  If	  all	  three	  legs	  are	  not	  strong,	  the	  stool	  will	  fall	  apart	  whenever	  any	  weight,	  or	  disturbance,	  is	  put	  upon	  it	  (Boettke	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  All	  over	  the	  world,	  coastal	  communities	  are	  at	  an	  increasing	  risk	  of	  facing	  coastal	  hazards,	  which	  threaten	  the	  overall	  health	  and	  sustainability	  of	  the	  natural	  and	  human	  environments.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  the	  population	  living	  near	  the	  coasts.	  Worldwide,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  23%	  of	  the	  population	  lives	  in	  areas	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CHAPTER	  3:	  	  RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  
3.1	  Choosing	  Variables	  	   The	  independent	  variables	  for	  this	  study	  can	  be	  organized	  into	  three	  categories,	  each	  representing	  a	  population’s	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  disasters.	  These	  categories	  are	  capacity	  to	  adapt,	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  environmental	  exposure	  to	  the	  disaster.	  	  
3.1.1	  Vulnerability	  Variables	  	   From	  the	  literature,	  it	  has	  been	  gathered	  that	  social	  vulnerability	  is	  related	  to	  a	  decreased	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  and	  recover	  from	  disasters.	  It	  has	  been	  seen	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  aspects	  of	  personal	  income	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  a	  person’s	  social	  vulnerability.	  In	  particular,	  having	  low	  personal	  income	  has	  a	  positive	  correlation	  to	  social	  vulnerability	  (Masozera	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Cutter	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  In	  addition,	  persons	  with	  low	  income	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  own	  a	  vehicle	  and	  are	  therefore	  dependent	  on	  others	  to	  evacuate	  them.	  For	  this	  reason	  they	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  personally	  affected	  by	  a	  disaster	  (Redlener,	  2008).	  For	  this	  study,	  the	  percentage	  of	  families	  living	  in	  poverty	  (pctpov)	  is	  included	  to	  represent	  this	  aspect	  of	  vulnerability	  within	  a	  community.	  	  	   Members	  of	  the	  population	  who	  are	  in	  the	  extremes	  of	  age	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  difficulty	  in	  dealing	  with	  disasters	  in	  terms	  of	  actually	  moving	  out	  of	  harm’s	  way.	  They	  may	  rely	  on	  the	  assistance	  of	  others	  to	  evacuate	  and	  care	  for	  themselves,	  and	  their	  social	  vulnerability	  is	  therefore	  increased.	  In	  some	  cases,	  those	  who	  care	  for	  them	  also	  tend	  to	  have	  higher	  social	  vulnerability	  because	  of	  the	  resources	  they	  have	  spent	  on	  caring	  for	  those	  in	  the	  age	  extremities	  (Masozera	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Cutter	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et	  al.,	  2003).	  This	  aspect	  of	  vulnerability	  is	  represented	  here	  as	  the	  median	  age	  in	  each	  county	  (age).	  	  	   A	  final	  community	  characteristic	  that	  influences	  vulnerability	  to	  disasters	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  residential	  property	  within	  the	  county.	  For	  example,	  mobile	  homes	  are	  particularly	  prone	  to	  damage	  from	  an	  event	  such	  as	  hurricane	  (Cutter	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  percentage	  of	  mobile	  homes	  in	  each	  county	  (pctmobile)	  is	  therefore	  included	  in	  this	  study.	  
3.1.2	  Capacity	  to	  Adapt	  Variables	  	   Within	  the	  category	  of	  Capacity	  to	  Adapt	  are	  variables	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  affect	  a	  community’s	  resilience	  and	  social	  capital.	  Social	  capital	  is	  defined	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  as	  “…a	  set	  of	  adaptive	  capacities	  that	  can	  support	  the	  process	  of	  community	  resilience	  to	  maintain	  and	  sustain	  community	  health”	  (Sherrieb	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  	   The	  ability	  of	  a	  county	  government	  to	  plan	  for	  and	  mitigate	  disaster	  effects,	  and	  adapt	  to	  them	  if	  need	  be,	  is	  related	  to	  how	  well	  the	  community	  members	  will	  recover.	  In	  order	  to	  represent	  the	  overall	  economic	  and	  professional	  conditions	  within	  each	  county,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  was	  used	  to	  indicate	  whether	  or	  not	  each	  county	  was	  located	  within	  a	  Metropolitan	  Statistical	  Area	  (msa).	  An	  MSA	  is	  an	  area	  defined	  by	  an	  urban	  core	  of	  50,000	  or	  more	  people	  and	  includes	  the	  surrounding	  counties,	  which	  are	  determined	  to	  be	  socially	  and	  economically	  tied	  to	  the	  urban	  core	  (www.census.gov).	  However,	  because	  binary	  variables	  are	  invalid	  in	  a	  linear	  regression	  model,	  the	  MSA	  variable	  will	  be	  excluded	  and	  will	  instead	  only	  be	  used	  in	  
	   22	  
a	  difference	  of	  means	  test	  to	  compare	  the	  PA	  funds	  between	  those	  counties	  within	  and	  not	  within	  an	  MSA.	  	   In	  order	  to	  try	  and	  capture	  any	  political	  influences	  coming	  from	  members	  of	  congress	  in	  each	  state,	  I	  included	  a	  variable	  with	  the	  number	  of	  congress	  members	  each	  state	  had	  on	  a	  FEMA	  oversight	  committee	  in	  the	  109th	  Congress	  (congress).	  This	  method	  was	  adapted	  from	  the	  related	  research	  by	  Garret	  and	  Sobel	  (2003)	  regarding	  political	  influences	  on	  federal	  disaster	  relief.	  The	  FEMA	  Oversight	  Committees	  are	  the	  House	  Appropriations	  Subcommittee	  on	  Homeland	  Security,	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Homeland	  Security,	  the	  Senate	  Appropriation	  Subcommittee	  on	  Homeland	  Security,	  and	  the	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Homeland	  Security	  and	  Government	  Affairs.	  	   A	  third	  aspect	  of	  a	  community’s	  capacity	  to	  adapt	  included	  in	  this	  study	  is	  the	  density	  of	  the	  population,	  in	  term	  of	  population	  per	  square	  mile	  (popsqmile).	  It	  has	  been	  seen	  in	  relevant	  research	  that	  rural	  populations	  can	  have	  less	  access	  to	  information	  and	  resources	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  be	  better	  prepared	  in	  handling	  a	  large	  natural	  disaster	  event	  (Cutter	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  
3.1.3	  Exposure	  Variables	  	   According	  to	  Cutter	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  exposure	  is	  “…the	  result	  of	  physical	  location	  and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  a	  particular	  place.”	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  exposure	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  affects	  of	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  physical	  location	  and	  character	  of	  the	  environment.	  This	  is	  represented	  here	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  severely	  damaged	  housing	  units	  within	  each	  county	  (pctsvrdam).	  This	  data	  was	  collected	  by	  FEMA	  field	  agents	  by	  way	  of	  direct	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observations	  while	  they	  were	  determining	  aid	  eligibility.	  The	  data	  was	  gathered	  in	  the	  time	  between	  the	  storm	  event	  and	  February	  12,	  2006.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  “Severe	  Damage”	  the	  housing	  unit	  had	  to	  have	  experienced	  at	  least	  $5,200	  of	  damage,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Orleans,	  St.	  Bernard,	  and	  Jefferson	  Parishes,	  had	  to	  have	  had	  flooding	  of	  at	  least	  one	  foot	  of	  water	  (HUD,	  2006).	  	  Table	  3.1	  Variables	  Used	  in	  this	  Study	  
VARIABLE	  NAME	   DESCRIPTION	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  
PERCAPFEMA	  
Per	  capita	  amount	  (in	  dollars)	  of	  FEMA	  
Public	  Assistance	  funds,	  2005-­‐2006	  
	  (www.Data.gov)	  
Independent	  Variables:	  
(Capacity	  to	  Adapt)	  
POPSQMILE	  
Population	  per	  square	  mile,	  2000	  
(U.	  S.	  Census	  Bureau)	  
CONGRESS	   Number	  of	  Congress	  members	  on	  a	  FEMA	  
Oversight	  Committee,	  109th	  Congress	  
(U.	  S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office)	  
MSA	   Dummy	  variable,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  
county	  is	  located	  in	  a	  Metropolitan	  
Statistical	  Area,	  2005	  
(U.	  S.	  Census	  Bureau)	  
(Vulnerability)	  
PCTPOV	  
%	  families	  living	  in	  poverty,	  2000	  
(U.	  S.	  Census	  Bureau)	  
AGE	   Resident	  median	  age,	  2000	  
(U.	  S.	  Census	  Bureau)	  
PCTMOBILE	   %	  occupied	  housing	  units	  that	  are	  mobile	  
homes,	  2000	  
(U.	  S.	  Census	  Bureau)	  
(Exposure)	  
PCTSVRDAM	  
%	  occupied	  housing	  units	  with	  severe	  
damage,	  2006	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3.2	  Data	  Analysis	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CHAPTER	  4:	  SURVEY	  METHODS	  
4.1	  Survey	  Instrument	  
	   A	  brief	  survey	  was	  sent	  out	  via	  email	  to	  one	  county	  official	  in	  each	  of	  the	  136	  counties	  in	  the	  study	  area	  during	  the	  fall	  of	  2012	  (See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  Survey	  Materials).	  These	  officials	  were	  the	  Disaster	  Management	  Coordinator,	  County	  Manager,	  or	  equivalent.	  Email	  addresses	  for	  the	  participants	  were	  acquired	  from	  county	  websites	  in	  most	  cases,	  although	  a	  few	  were	  obtained	  from	  state	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency	  websites.	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  most	  accurate	  responses	  possible,	  the	  email	  received	  by	  each	  county	  official	  asked	  them	  to	  forward	  the	  email	  to	  the	  person	  most	  knowledgeable	  of	  the	  recovery	  process	  following	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season,	  if	  they	  felt	  like	  they	  were	  not	  that	  person.	  	   The	  survey	  consisted	  of	  6	  questions.	  The	  first	  simply	  asked	  the	  participant	  to	  identify	  their	  county	  and	  state.	  The	  second	  and	  third	  question	  asked	  the	  respondents	  to	  rank	  the	  level	  of	  priority	  given	  to	  recovery	  activities	  such	  as	  infrastructure	  and	  housing	  immediately	  following	  the	  hurricane(s)	  and	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  The	  next	  question	  asked	  the	  respondents	  which	  activities	  were	  completed	  more	  successfully,	  immediate,	  long-­‐term,	  or	  both.	  The	  fifth	  question	  listed	  some	  problems	  commonly	  experienced	  by	  communities	  following	  the	  hurricanes	  in	  dealing	  with	  FEMA	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  signify	  which	  problems,	  if	  any,	  were	  experienced	  in	  their	  county.	  The	  sixth	  and	  final	  question	  simply	  asked	  them	  to	  provide	  any	  additional	  comments	  that	  they	  had.	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4.2	  Survey	  Recipients	  	  	   Following	  the	  initial	  email,	  the	  survey	  received	  16	  responses	  out	  of	  136.	  A	  reminder	  email	  was	  sent	  out	  two	  weeks	  following	  the	  initial	  request.	  This	  generated	  eight	  more	  responses,	  with	  a	  total	  now	  of	  24.	  Two	  weeks	  following	  the	  reminder,	  a	  final	  reminder	  was	  sent	  and	  generated	  9	  more	  responses.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  surveys	  completed	  was	  33	  out	  of	  136.	  After	  approximately	  two	  months,	  the	  survey	  was	  closed	  with	  a	  response	  rate	  of	  24%.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  RESULTS	  
5.1	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  	   The	  highest	  amount	  of	  Public	  Assistance	  funding	  went	  to	  East	  Feliciana	  parish	  in	  Louisiana	  ($73,182.24	  per	  capita).	  Louisiana	  also	  had	  the	  highest	  average	  of	  PA	  funding	  ($4,262.78).	  This	  makes	  sense	  since	  Louisiana	  had	  the	  highest	  average	  damage	  (31%	  of	  housing	  units)	  and	  St.	  Bernard	  Parish,	  Louisiana	  had	  the	  highest	  of	  any	  other	  county	  (76%).	  The	  lowest	  amount	  of	  PA	  funding	  occurred	  in	  Wilcox	  County,	  Alabama	  ($1.32	  per	  capita).	  Alabama	  had	  the	  lowest	  average	  of	  any	  state	  as	  well	  ($33.20	  per	  capita).	  However,	  the	  lowest	  amount	  of	  damage	  was	  instead	  in	  Highlands	  County,	  Florida	  (0.06%)	  and	  the	  lowest	  average	  of	  any	  state	  (8%)	  was	  also	  in	  Florida.	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  although	  Alabama	  had	  the	  lowest	  average	  per	  capita	  PA	  funds,	  Florida	  had	  the	  lowest	  average	  percentage	  of	  damaged	  housing	  units	  due	  to	  the	  hurricanes.	  	   Now	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  variables	  representing	  socioeconomic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  study	  area,	  beginning	  with	  those	  that	  deal	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  adapt	  to	  disasters.	  The	  highest	  average	  population	  density	  (residents	  per	  square	  mile)	  was	  found	  in	  Florida.	  However,	  the	  maximum	  density	  in	  a	  single	  county	  was	  Orleans	  Parish,	  Louisiana,	  with	  a	  population	  density	  of	  2,678	  persons	  per	  square	  mile.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  large	  population	  of	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  The	  smallest	  average	  population	  density	  average	  was	  found	  in	  Alabama,	  but	  the	  smallest	  minimum	  within	  a	  single	  county	  was	  Cameron	  Parish,	  Louisiana	  with	  a	  population	  density	  of	  7.6	  persons	  per	  square	  mile.	  The	  congress	  and	  msa	  variables	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	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descriptive	  statistics	  analysis	  because	  they	  do	  not	  differ	  county	  to	  county.	  Also,	  msa	  is	  a	  categorical	  dummy	  variable.	  	   Now,	  the	  variables	  characterizing	  vulnerability	  within	  the	  study	  area	  will	  be	  covered,	  beginning	  with	  pctpov.	  Florida	  had	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  average	  number	  of	  families	  in	  poverty	  overall	  (27%),	  as	  did	  Alabama.	  However,	  the	  county	  with	  the	  highest	  percentage	  of	  impoverished	  families	  was	  Sabine	  County,	  Texas.	  The	  lowest	  average	  percentage	  of	  families	  in	  poverty	  was	  in	  Louisiana	  (26%)	  and	  the	  lowest	  overall	  percentage	  was	  in	  West	  Feliciana	  Parish,	  Louisiana	  (18%).	  	  	   The	  highest	  percentage	  of	  mobile	  homes	  was	  found	  in	  Alabama	  overall,	  but	  the	  highest	  single	  county	  was	  located	  in	  Florida.	  Obviously,	  Alabama	  has	  more	  mobile	  homes	  generally	  spread	  throughout	  the	  state	  and	  Florida	  has	  areas	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  mobile	  homes	  but	  some	  areas	  with	  very	  few.	  The	  fewest	  mobile	  homes	  are	  found	  within	  Louisiana,	  which	  may	  be	  surprising	  considering	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  rural	  areas	  within	  the	  state.	  However,	  one	  must	  consider	  the	  proximity	  to	  water	  and	  flooding	  events	  that	  takes	  place	  regularly	  within	  the	  state	  that	  would	  deter	  residents	  from	  living	  in	  mobile	  homes.	  	   The	  average	  age	  of	  the	  population	  within	  the	  full	  study	  area	  is	  35.5.	  However,	  the	  counties	  in	  Florida	  have	  the	  oldest	  overall	  population	  and	  those	  in	  Mississippi	  have	  the	  youngest.	  This	  is	  logical	  due	  to	  the	  popularity	  of	  Florida	  for	  retirees.	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Table	  5.1	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
VARIABLE	   MEAN	   STDDEV	   MIN	   MAX	  
PA	  Funds	  Per	  Capita	   	   	   	   	  
Full	  Sample	  (n=136)	   1476.44	   7220.69	   1.32	   73182.24	  
Florida	  (n=14)	   182.08	   225.52	   5.51	   881.38	  
Louisiana	  (n=38)	   4262.78	   11369.17	   5.51	   73182.24	  
Mississippi	  (n=49)	   662.71	   2030.88	   6.88	   12737.00	  
Alabama	  (n=12)	   33.20	   54.46	   1.32	   198.85	  
Texas	  (n=23)	   147.37	   326.16	   1.84	   1541.92	  
Percent	  Severely	  Damaged	  Housing	  Units	   	   	  
Full	  Sample	  (n=136)	   5.07	   13.29	   0	   78.4	  
Florida	  (n=14)	   1.74	   3.12	   0	   11.3	  
Louisiana	  (n=38)	   10.16	   20.35	   0	   78.4	  
Mississippi	  (n=49)	   4.52	   11.74	   0.1	   69.8	  
Alabama	  (n=12)	   0.46	   0.60	   0	   2.1	  
Texas	  (n=23)	   2.27	   2.95	   0	   8.5	  
Population	  Per	  Square	  
Mile	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Full	  Sample	  (n=136)	   165.64	   353.23	   7.60	   2677.64	  
Florida	  (n=14)	   375.98	   418.05	   13.70	   1346.90	  
Louisiana	  (n=38)	   231.37	   494.58	   7.60	   2677.80	  
Mississippi	  (n=49)	   63.70	   64.64	   13.60	   326.30	  
Alabama	  (n=12)	   59.47	   90.25	   14.80	   324.30	  
Texas	  (n=23)	   201.56	   414.16	   16.20	   1966.80	  
Age	   	   	   	   	  
Full	  Sample	  (n=136)	   35.45	   3.80	   24.80	   50.00	  
Florida	  (n=14)	   41.51	   5.37	   29.50	   50.00	  
Louisiana	  (n=38)	   34.24	   1.79	   28.30	   38.20	  
Mississippi	  (n=49)	   34.16	   2.69	   24.80	   38.50	  
Alabama	  (n=12)	   35.26	   2.14	   31.90	   39.00	  
Texas	  (n=23)	   36.62	   4.10	   29.70	   47.00	  
Percent	  Families	  in	  
Poverty	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Full	  Sample	  (n=136)	   26.62	   1.84	   18.02	   30.31	  
Florida	  (n=14)	   27.11	   2.02	   22.92	   29.78	  
Louisiana	  (n=38)	   26.19	   1.77	   18.02	   28.30	  
Mississippi	  (n=49)	   26.59	   1.65	   21.55	   28.67	  
Alabama	  (n=12)	   27.22	   1.27	   24.85	   28.87	  
Texas	  (n=23)	   26.80	   2.37	   18.67	   30.31	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Table	  5.1	  Continued	  
VARIABLE	   MEAN	   STDDEV	   MIN	   MAX	  
Percent	  Mobile	  Homes	   	   	   	   	  
Full	  Sample	  (n=136)	   9.60	   5.17	   0.15	   30.07	  
Florida	  (n=14)	   9.56	   8.39	   0.68	   30.07	  
Louisiana	  (n=38)	   8.30	   4.62	   0.15	   24.72	  
Mississippi	  (n=49)	   9.21	   3.21	   1.58	   17.22	  
Alabama	  (n=12)	   12.91	   4.46	   3.85	   18.63	  
Texas	  (n=23)	   10.83	   6.59	   1.15	   28.81	  *msa	  and	  congress	  variables	  excluded	  
5.2	  Correlation	  Analysis	  
	   In	  order	  to	  analyze	  the	  correlations	  between	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (pctsvrdam)	  and	  the	  independent	  variables,	  and	  also	  between	  the	  independent	  variables	  themselves,	  a	  bivariate	  correlation	  analysis	  was	  performed	  using	  SPSS	  Version	  21.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  5.2.	  Damage	  has	  the	  highest	  correlation	  with	  PA	  funds	  with	  a	  Pearson’s	  r	  value	  of	  .422,	  which	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level.	  This	  means	  that	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  severe	  damage	  increases,	  so	  does	  the	  amount	  of	  PA	  expenditure	  within	  the	  county.	  	  	   The	  only	  other	  variable	  with	  a	  significant	  correlation	  is	  the	  MSA	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  county	  is	  located	  within	  a	  MSA.	  This	  has	  a	  positive	  correlation	  with	  a	  Pearson’s	  r	  value	  of	  	  .194,	  which	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  counties	  that	  are	  a	  part	  of	  an	  MSA	  are	  receiving	  more	  funds.	  Although	  this	  correlation	  is	  significant,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  significant	  as	  the	  correlation	  between	  damage	  and	  PA	  funds.	  No	  other	  independent	  variable	  had	  a	  significant	  correlation	  with	  PA	  funds.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that,	  as	  per	  the	  most	  recent	  research	  regarding	  political	  influences	  on	  FEMA	  disaster	  expenditures,	  congress	  does	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  correlation	  with	  PA	  funds	  in	  this	  study.	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PCTSVRDAM	   .422**	  
PCTPOV	   -­‐.118	  
PCTMOBILE	   -­‐.006	  
AGE	   .001	  
CONGRESS	   -­‐.165	  
POPSQMILE	   .003	  
*Correlation	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  
**Correlation	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level.	  
	  
5.3	  Regression	  Analysis	  
	   In	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  causal	  relationships	  between	  FEMA	  PA	  funds	  and	  the	  7	  independent	  variables,	  a	  multiple	  regression	  analysis	  was	  performed	  using	  SPSS	  21.	  The	  variables	  were	  entered	  into	  the	  model	  using	  the	  forced	  entry	  method	  (Enter	  in	  SPSS),	  which	  forces	  all	  independent	  variables,	  or	  predictors,	  into	  the	  model	  in	  unison.	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   A	  summary	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  5.3.	  The	  adjusted	  R	  square	  is	  .190,	  which	  means	  that	  this	  regression	  model	  was	  able	  to	  explain	  about	  19%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  FEMA	  PA	  funds.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  model	  represents	  the	  best	  model	  that	  could	  be	  obtained	  from	  various	  variables,	  meaning	  that	  several	  other	  model	  were	  tried	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  a	  higher	  R	  squared	  value,	  but	  that	  was	  not	  able	  to	  be	  done.	  	  Table	  5.3	  Regression	  Model	  Summary	  
	  	   Below,	  in	  Table	  5.4,	  are	  the	  results	  of	  the	  ANOVA	  analysis.	  According	  to	  these	  results,	  the	  regression	  model	  is	  a	  good	  fit	  to	  the	  data	  overall,	  with	  an	  F	  value	  of	  6.261.	  This	  value	  of	  F	  is	  highly	  significant	  with	  a	  p	  <	  .001.	  	  Table	  5.4	  Analysis	  of	  Variance	  
	  	   The	  coefficients	  for	  each	  predictor	  in	  the	  model	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.5.	  Damage	  (pctsvrdam)	  is	  the	  most	  significant	  predictor,	  with	  a	  Beta	  value	  of	  .429.	  The	  only	  other	  significant	  variable	  is	  poverty	  (pctpov),	  which	  has	  a	  Beta	  value	  of	  -­‐.226.	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  point	  out	  that,	  once	  again,	  there	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  Congressional	  influences	  on	  the	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FEMA	  PA	  fund	  distribution.	  The	  congress	  variable	  is	  not	  showing	  significance	  in	  the	  regression	  analysis.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  a	  difference	  of	  means	  test	  was	  performed	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  funding	  received	  by	  counties	  who	  were	  in	  an	  MSA	  in	  2005	  and	  those	  who	  were	  not.	  The	  difference	  in	  funding	  amount	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  is	  significant,	  at	  p=	  .044.	  This	  indicates	  that	  counties	  who	  are	  economically	  and	  socially	  tied	  to	  urban	  centers	  received	  significantly	  more	  funding	  than	  those	  not	  tied	  to	  an	  urban	  center.	  Table	  5.5	  Regression	  Model	  Results	  
	  	   The	  strong	  positive	  relationship	  between	  damage	  experienced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2005	  hurricanes	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  FEMA	  Public	  Assistance	  funding	  received	  by	  a	  county	  is	  a	  very	  good	  sign	  about	  the	  management	  of	  the	  recovery	  by	  FEMA.	  One	  would	  expect	  that	  locations	  where	  more	  damage	  is	  done	  will	  require	  more	  money	  to	  rebuild,	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  what	  happened.	  The	  other	  significant	  predictor	  of	  PA	  funding	  was	  poverty,	  with	  a	  negative	  relationship.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  incidence	  of	  poverty	  within	  a	  county	  appears	  to	  encumber	  the	  amount	  of	  federal	  disaster	  aid	  dollars	  they	  are	  getting.	  This	  is	  a	  disheartening	  result	  because,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  large	  natural	  disaster,	  those	  who	  are	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CHAPTER	  6:	  SURVEY	  RESULTS	  
6.1	  Survey	  Response	  Analysis	  
	   As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  overall	  response	  rate	  of	  the	  survey	  was	  24%.	  Figure	  6.1	  shows	  the	  counties	  that	  responded	  to	  the	  survey	  with	  those	  that	  did	  not	  respond	  or	  chose	  to	  not	  be	  identified.	  Texas	  had	  the	  highest	  response	  rate	  with	  7	  responses	  out	  of	  the	  23	  counties	  included	  in	  this	  study,	  or	  30%	  response.	  Louisiana	  parishes	  had	  a	  26%	  response	  rate.	  Florida	  counties	  had	  a	  21%	  response	  rate.	  Mississippi	  counties	  had	  an	  18%	  response	  rate.	  Finally,	  Alabama	  had	  the	  lowest	  response	  rate	  of	  17%.	  	  Two	  respondents	  chose	  to	  not	  specify	  their	  county	  and	  state.	  
	  Figure	  6.1	  Map	  Showing	  Survey	  Response	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   In	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  was	  any	  bias	  in	  the	  survey	  response,	  or	  certain	  characteristics	  about	  those	  who	  responded	  that	  differs	  significantly	  from	  those	  who	  did	  not,	  a	  difference	  of	  means	  test	  was	  performed	  using	  the	  independent	  t	  test.	  The	  variables	  compared	  between	  groups	  were	  level	  of	  education,	  population	  density,	  and	  per	  capita	  income,	  all	  gathered	  from	  the	  2000	  Census.	  Table	  6.1	  below	  shows	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  two	  groups.	  Group	  1	  includes	  the	  counties	  who	  responded	  and	  group	  2	  includes	  those	  who	  did	  not	  respond.	  Table	  6.1	  Group	  Statistics	  of	  Response	  Bias	  Analysis	  
	  
	   On	  average,	  the	  group	  1	  members	  are	  more	  educated,	  make	  more	  money	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis,	  and	  live	  in	  more	  densely	  populated	  areas.	  The	  average	  percentage	  of	  people	  with	  more	  than	  a	  high	  school	  diploma	  in	  group	  1	  is	  10.8%,	  while	  the	  average	  of	  those	  in	  group	  2	  is	  about	  9%.	  The	  average	  population	  density	  in	  group	  1	  is	  about	  265	  people	  per	  square	  mile,	  while	  in	  group	  2	  it	  is	  about	  140	  people	  per	  square	  mile.	  Finally,	  the	  average	  per	  capita	  income	  in	  group	  1	  is	  about	  $17,642,	  and	  in	  group	  2	  it	  is	  about	  $15,614.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  these	  differences	  are	  statistically	  significant,	  the	  independent	  samples	  t	  test	  results	  must	  be	  analyzed	  (Table	  6.2).	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Table	  6.2	  Independent	  T	  Test	  Results	  
	  
	   Because	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Equality	  of	  Variances	  test	  for	  higher	  education	  (pcthighed)	  is	  above	  0.05,	  the	  values	  for	  “equal	  variances	  assumed”	  were	  analyzed.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  t	  test	  for	  higher	  education	  are	  significant,	  with	  a	  p	  value	  of	  .049.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  group	  of	  those	  who	  responded	  to	  the	  survey	  (group	  1)	  are	  significantly	  more	  educated	  than	  the	  members	  of	  group	  2,	  who	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  survey.	  	  	   For	  population	  density,	  the	  p	  value	  for	  the	  Equality	  of	  Variance	  test	  is	  below	  0.05,	  equal	  variance	  is	  not	  assumed	  and	  the	  values	  for	  that	  category	  are	  thus	  analyzed.	  The	  t	  test	  for	  differences	  in	  population	  density	  of	  the	  two	  groups	  (p	  =	  .286)	  is	  not	  significant.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  are	  not	  significant	  differences	  in	  population	  density	  between	  those	  who	  responded	  to	  the	  survey	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not.	  	   The	  third	  and	  final	  variable	  I	  tested	  for	  differences	  of	  means	  is	  per	  capita	  income.	  Equal	  variance	  in	  this	  data	  is	  assumed	  (p=	  .092),	  and	  the	  t	  test	  results	  are	  significant	  (p=	  .014).	  This	  means	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  income	  earned	  on	  a	  per	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capita	  basis	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  To	  summarize,	  the	  responders	  to	  the	  survey	  are	  significantly	  more	  educated	  and	  make	  more	  money.	  Although	  their	  average	  population	  density	  is	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  the	  non-­‐responders,	  the	  difference	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  
6.2	  Survey	  Data	  Analysis	   	  	   The	  first	  two	  questions	  ask	  the	  participants	  about	  how	  they	  rate	  recovery	  activities	  during	  different	  phases	  of	  recovery.	  The	  recovery	  activities	  were	  adapted	  from	  the	  National	  
Disaster	  Recovery	  Framework	  (FEMA,	  2011).	  For	  the	  first	  question,	  the	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate,	  from	  1	  to	  5,	  the	  level	  of	  priority	  that	  was	  placed	  on	  certain	  immediate	  recovery	  activities	  within	  their	  county	  (see	  Figure	  4.1).	  Unfortunately,	  the	  survey	  software	  did	  not	  function	  properly	  on	  this	  question	  by	  not	  allowing	  the	  participants	  to	  rate	  more	  than	  one	  activity	  as	  the	  same	  priority	  level.	  Therefore,	  the	  results	  may	  not	  be	  reflective	  of	  the	  true	  priorities	  given	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  storms.	  However,	  the	  participants	  had	  the	  option	  to	  not	  answer	  the	  question,	  and	  this	  was	  done	  by	  three	  of	  the	  33	  respondents.	  The	  highest	  rated	  immediate	  recovery	  activity	  were	  those	  in	  the	  Debris/Infrastructure	  category,	  with	  an	  average	  rating	  of	  4.52	  out	  of	  a	  possible	  5.	  This	  includes	  the	  removal	  of	  debris	  and	  the	  immediate	  repair	  of	  infrastructure.	  The	  Business	  category,	  which	  includes	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  local	  business	  operations,	  received	  an	  average	  rating	  of	  3.35/5.	  Housing,	  in	  particular	  providing	  temporary	  housing	  solutions,	  received	  an	  average	  rating	  of	  3.3/5.	  Public	  Health	  and	  Health	  Care,	  defined	  as	  providing	  continuity	  of	  care	  through	  temporary	  facilities,	  received	  an	  average	  rating	  of	  3/5.	  The	  Mitigation	  Activities	  Category,	  which	  includes	  informing	  community	  members	  of	  opportunities	  to	  build	  back	  stronger,	  received	  an	  average	  priority	  level	  rating	  of	  2.5/3.	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Finally,	  the	  lowest	  average	  priority	  level	  rating	  given	  during	  the	  immediate	  response	  phase	  following	  the	  storms	  was	  the	  Emotional/Psychological	  category.	  This	  was	  defined	  to	  be	  support	  networks	  provided	  by	  the	  county	  governments.	  The	  average	  rating	  given	  to	  this	  was	  a	  2.2	  out	  of	  5.	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  average	  ratings	  for	  this	  question	  are	  fairly	  heterogeneous.	  While	  a	  couple	  categories	  were	  given	  high	  ratings	  on	  average,	  some	  (particularly	  Emotional/Psychological	  and	  Mitigation	  Activities)	  were	  given	  fairly	  low	  average	  ratings.	  
	  Figure	  6.2	  Immediate	  Recovery	  Activities	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term	  recovery	  activities,	  as	  opposed	  to	  actions	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  storms	  (Figure	  4.2).	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of	  2.88.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  question	  differ	  from	  those	  of	  the	  first,	  particularly	  in	  that	  the	  average	  ratings	  were	  more	  centralized	  and	  homogeneous.	  None	  were	  as	  low	  or	  high	  as	  the	  average	  rating	  given	  to	  recovery	  activity	  categories	  in	  the	  first	  question.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  differed	  from	  location	  to	  location,	  but	  short	  term	  is	  about	  the	  same	  everywhere.	  This	  makes	  sense	  since	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  a	  major	  disaster	  the	  first	  thing	  local	  governments	  will	  want	  to	  do	  is	  get	  the	  roads	  and	  power	  lines	  repaired	  so	  that	  rescue	  and	  other	  recovery	  activities	  can	  take	  place.	  	   For	  the	  third	  question,	  the	  survey	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  choose	  which	  recovery	  activities	  were	  more	  successfully	  achieved	  overall,	  immediate,	  long-­‐term,	  or	  both	  equally	  (Figure	  4.3).	  Both	  long-­‐term	  and	  immediate	  recovery	  activities	  were	  indicated	  48.5%	  of	  the	  time	  as	  which	  phase	  was	  more	  successfully	  carried	  out	  following	  the	  hurricanes	  of	  2005.	  Obviously,	  there	  are	  a	  plethora	  of	  reasons	  for	  why	  this	  is	  so,	  including	  varying	  amounts	  of	  resources	  and	  preparation	  for	  such	  an	  event.	  Only	  3%	  of	  respondents	  felt	  that	  both	  phases	  of	  the	  recovery	  were	  equally	  successful.	  This	  means	  there	  is	  obviously	  much	  room	  for	  improvement	  within	  the	  field	  of	  disaster	  recovery,	  as	  ideally	  both	  phases	  would	  be	  successful	  and	  not	  one	  or	  the	  other.	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  that	  more	  respondents	  did	  not	  indicate	  the	  short-­‐term	  recovery	  as	  more	  successful	  considering	  that	  FEMA	  PA	  funds	  pay	  100%	  of	  short	  term	  projects,	  granted	  that	  the	  local	  government	  was	  able	  to	  successfully	  get	  the	  project	  approved.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  final	  survey	  question.	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  Figure	  6.4	  Immediate	  Recovery	  vs.	  Long-­‐Term	  Recovery	  
	   In	  the	  fourth	  and	  final	  question	  of	  the	  survey,	  besides	  the	  comment	  section	  at	  the	  end,	  the	  participants	  were	  requested	  to	  indicate	  which	  of	  a	  list	  of	  common	  issues	  their	  county	  government	  experienced	  during	  the	  recovery	  process	  from	  the	  2005	  hurricanes.	  These	  common	  problems	  were	  adapted	  from	  a	  GulfGov	  report	  (Pike,	  2007)	  that	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  experienced	  during	  the	  recovery	  process	  in	  Mississippi	  and	  Louisiana	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  Because	  Hurricanes	  Katrina,	  Rita,	  and	  Wilma	  occurred	  so	  closely	  together,	  spatially	  and	  temporally,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  these	  issues	  could	  have	  been	  experienced	  outside	  of	  Louisiana	  and	  Mississippi.	  That	  is	  why	  they	  were	  included	  in	  my	  survey.	  	  	   The	  list	  of	  common	  issues	  and	  results	  for	  this	  question	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  6.4	  below.	  The	  most	  common	  issue,	  of	  those	  listed,	  and	  indicated	  by	  nearly	  70%	  of	  
48.50%	  48.50%	  
3.00%	  Which	  were	  more	  successfully	  achieved?	  
Immediate	  recovery	  activities	  Long-­‐term	  recovery	  activities	  Both	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respondents,	  was	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  county	  governments	  to	  get	  firm	  commitments	  from	  FEMA	  regarding	  the	  eligibility	  of	  a	  given	  project	  for	  federal	  funding.	  Because	  the	  Public	  Assistance	  program	  is	  designed	  as	  a	  cost	  reimbursement	  process,	  it	  can	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  a	  local	  government,	  particularly	  in	  a	  less	  wealthy	  area,	  to	  begin	  working	  on	  a	  project	  if	  there	  is	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  project’s	  eligibility	  for	  funding.	  Also,	  sometimes	  a	  project	  will	  be	  deemed	  ineligible	  after	  the	  initial	  phases	  of	  the	  project	  have	  already	  been	  started	  and	  this	  will	  leave	  the	  state	  trying	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  money	  to	  repay	  the	  federal	  government.	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   All	  the	  other	  issues	  listed	  in	  the	  question	  were	  indicated	  by	  about	  35%	  to	  46%	  of	  respondents	  and	  will	  now	  be	  discussed	  individually.	  Some	  local	  governments,	  particularly	  in	  rural	  areas,	  have	  smaller	  staffs	  and	  will,	  in	  some	  cases,	  appoint	  the	  same	  person	  for	  multiple	  positions	  within	  the	  county	  government.	  For	  example,	  the	  County	  Judge	  may	  also	  serve	  as	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  County	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency.	  This	  can	  become	  problematic	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  large	  disaster	  event	  where	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  paperwork	  and	  other	  responsibilities	  required	  of	  the	  local	  government	  staff.	  36.4%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  a	  “lack	  of	  local	  staff”	  was	  an	  issue	  they	  experienced	  during	  the	  recovery	  from	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  Rita,	  or	  Wilma.	  The	  second	  issue	  listed,	  “Delays	  in	  projects	  due	  to	  the	  high	  turnover	  rate	  of	  FEMA	  staff”,	  was	  designated	  by	  45.5%	  of	  survey	  participants	  as	  an	  issue	  they	  dealt	  with	  during	  the	  recovery	  process.	  According	  to	  the	  GulfGov	  report	  
Spending	  Federal	  Disaster	  Aid	  (Pike,	  2007),	  local	  government	  in	  Louisiana	  and	  Mississippi,	  where	  their	  study	  took	  place,	  indicated	  that	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  FEMA	  staff	  turnover	  caused	  several	  issues	  for	  the	  local	  government.	  These	  included	  delays	  in	  projects,	  construction,	  and	  cost	  estimation	  inaccuracies.	  Since	  almost	  50%	  of	  respondents	  had	  this	  issue	  as	  well,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  it	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  just	  Mississippi	  and	  Louisiana.	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  survey	  participants,	  “getting	  projects	  initiated	  and/or	  funded	  by	  FEMA	  due	  to	  the	  project	  costs	  being	  initially	  underestimated”	  was	  a	  common	  issue	  faced	  by	  local	  government,	  as	  indicated	  by	  36.4%	  of	  respondents.	  This	  issue	  occurs	  usually	  when	  the	  FEMA	  staff	  estimate	  the	  overall	  costs	  of	  a	  particular	  project	  and	  have	  that	  estimated	  amount	  approved	  for	  use	  by	  the	  local	  government	  and	  it	  ends	  up	  being	  considerably	  lower	  than	  the	  amount	  the	  project	  ends	  up	  being	  contracted	  for.	  Some	  counties	  saw	  project	  costs	  underestimated	  by	  as	  much	  as	  300%	  of	  the	  actual	  costs.	  This,	  like	  many	  other	  of	  the	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problems	  faced	  by	  the	  local	  staff,	  leads	  to	  the	  government	  having	  to	  pay	  for	  things	  they	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  money	  for	  at	  that	  time	  (Pike,	  2007).	  A	  related	  issue,	  “matching	  funds	  for	  FEMA	  Public	  Assistance	  program	  projects,”	  was	  problematic	  in	  45.5%	  of	  respondents’	  county	  governments.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Public	  Assistance	  program,	  local	  governments	  are	  expected	  to	  pay	  10%	  of	  project	  costs	  when	  it	  has	  been	  at	  least	  six	  months	  since	  the	  disaster.	  This	  way,	  the	  federal	  government	  covers	  100%	  of	  immediate	  emergency	  recovery	  actions,	  such	  as	  debris	  removal,	  but	  less	  when	  it	  comes	  time	  for	  long-­‐term	  projects,	  such	  as	  rebuilding	  schools	  and	  other	  buildings.	  However,	  in	  the	  past,	  this	  deadline	  requirement	  has	  been	  waived	  in	  the	  event	  of	  extreme	  events,	  like	  9/11	  and	  Hurricane	  Andrew.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  in	  particular,	  the	  deadline	  was	  not	  waived	  until	  May	  2007,	  a	  year	  and	  eight	  months	  after	  the	  disaster	  occurred.	  This	  left	  many	  governments	  without	  adequate	  funds	  and	  led	  many	  to	  set	  aside	  CDBG	  finds,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  have	  gone	  to	  help	  individuals,	  to	  use	  for	  Public	  Assistance	  projects	  (Pike,	  2007).	  Finally,	  a	  mere	  6.1%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  “None”	  of	  the	  issues	  I	  listed	  for	  them	  were	  experienced	  by	  their	  local	  government	  during	  the	  recovery	  from	  these	  storms.	  That	  means	  about	  2	  of	  the	  33	  participants	  chose	  this	  answer.	  The	  other	  31	  participants	  felt	  they	  had	  experienced	  one	  of	  the	  five	  issues	  listed	  which	  indicates	  the	  importance	  of	  addressing	  these	  issues.	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CHAPTER	  7:	  CONCLUSIONS	  	   This	  research	  has	  given	  insight	  into	  the	  factors	  that	  affected	  FEMA	  Public	  Assistance	  fund	  expenditure	  following	  the	  hurricanes	  of	  2005	  in	  the	  Gulf	  Coast.	  Although	  there	  is	  not	  a	  large	  body	  of	  existing	  research	  on	  this	  topic,	  relevant	  research	  suggests	  that	  those	  who	  are	  socially	  marginalized	  were	  disproportionately	  affected	  by	  the	  storm	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  successfully	  pull	  their	  lives	  back	  together.	  The	  significant	  negative	  correlation	  between	  the	  percentage	  of	  poverty-­‐stricken	  families	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  PA	  funds	  given	  within	  the	  county	  supports	  this	  research.	  This	  is	  a	  disheartening	  finding,	  but	  suggests	  there	  is	  much	  room	  for	  improvement	  in	  the	  management	  of	  federal	  disaster	  aid	  dollars	  to	  ensure	  that	  those	  most	  in	  need	  are	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  event	  of	  another	  large	  natural	  disaster.	  	  	   The	  strong	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  percentage	  of	  severely	  damaged	  houses	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  PA	  expenditure	  is	  not	  surprising	  and	  shows	  that	  the	  FEMA	  staff	  appropriately	  allocates	  money	  to	  where	  it	  is	  needed.	  Because	  the	  state	  government	  makes	  the	  decisions	  about	  where	  money	  is	  sent	  within	  the	  state,	  this	  result	  also	  suggests	  the	  level	  of	  damage	  within	  a	  county	  was	  taken	  into	  serious	  consideration	  before	  money	  was	  spent	  there.	  Although	  damage	  should	  be	  one	  of	  the	  criteria	  for	  Public	  Assistance	  eligibility,	  other	  factors	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  as	  well.	  Considering	  that	  poverty	  negatively	  affected	  a	  county’s	  federal	  aid,	  it	  appears	  this	  is	  not	  what	  happened.	  This	  is	  disheartening	  considering	  that	  wealthier	  populations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  insurance	  and	  other	  financial	  safety	  nets.	  In	  the	  future,	  FEMA	  should	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  limitations	  on	  some	  portions	  of	  the	  affected	  area	  that	  could	  be	  hindering	  a	  population’s	  ability	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  disaster	  and	  get	  aid	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  families.	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   This	  study	  also	  supports	  the	  findings	  of	  Sobel	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  by	  finding	  no	  significant	  correlation	  between	  a	  state’s	  presence	  on	  congressional	  FEMA	  oversight	  committees	  and	  federal	  aid	  dollar	  distribution.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  political	  influences	  on	  FEMA	  aid	  money	  has	  been	  improved.	  However,	  given	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  complaints	  that	  were	  given	  by	  the	  local	  governments,	  it	  seems	  there	  are	  still	  bureaucratic	  limitations	  of	  FEMA	  that	  may	  have	  been	  exacerbated	  by	  their	  reorganization	  and	  inclusion	  into	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  in	  2003	  that	  caused	  delays	  in	  funding,	  FEMA	  staff	  turnover,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  accountability	  in	  their	  spending.	  	  	   This	  study	  has	  also	  given	  insight	  into	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  recovery	  process	  at	  a	  local	  level.	  According	  to	  the	  results	  of	  the	  survey,	  infrastructure	  was	  given	  the	  highest	  priority	  overall	  during	  the	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  phases.	  This	  is	  what	  most	  citizens	  of	  an	  affected	  community	  would	  expect.	  Without	  the	  removal	  of	  debris	  and	  repairing	  of	  electrical	  lines,	  basic	  needs	  of	  the	  community	  cannot	  be	  met.	  The	  “Emotional/Psychological”	  category	  of	  recovery	  activities	  was	  given	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  attention	  following	  these	  storms	  in	  both	  the	  long-­‐	  and	  short-­‐	  term	  recovery	  phases.	  This	  may	  suggest	  a	  need	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  additional	  emotional	  support	  systems	  to	  alleviate	  some	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  mental	  health	  effects	  of	  such	  devastating	  natural	  disasters.	  Because	  97%	  of	  survey	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  either	  short-­‐term	  or	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  activities	  were	  more	  completed,	  and	  there	  was	  not	  more	  indicating	  that	  both	  were	  successful,	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  local	  governments	  could	  benefit	  from	  clearly	  defined	  goals	  and	  objectives	  following	  a	  large	  disaster	  event	  so	  that	  they	  could	  make	  sure	  to	  allocate	  resources	  appropriately	  in	  order	  to	  accomplish	  all	  that	  is	  necessary.	  	  
	   48	  
	   One	  shortcoming	  of	  this	  study	  was	  the	  time	  that	  has	  passed	  since	  the	  event	  being	  examined.	  This	  could	  have	  affected,	  for	  example,	  the	  response	  to	  the	  survey,	  since	  some	  local	  officials	  may	  not	  have	  been	  employed	  in	  their	  current	  position	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season	  eight	  years	  ago.	  Also,	  it	  is	  obviously	  unfortunate	  that	  the	  survey	  instrument	  did	  not	  properly	  function	  and	  therefore	  limited	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  survey	  results.	  More	  insights	  could	  have	  been	  gained	  from	  the	  survey	  responses	  if	  this	  had	  not	  occurred.	  	   For	  future	  policy	  development,	  policy	  makers	  should	  consider	  adopting	  institutional	  structures	  and	  policies	  that	  boost	  community	  engagement	  and	  draw	  from	  local	  knowledge.	  There	  should	  also	  be	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  development	  of	  relationships	  between	  community	  organizations	  and	  government.	  These	  relationships	  could	  allow	  aid	  to	  be	  provided	  to	  vulnerable	  populations	  through	  organizations	  they	  already	  know	  and	  trust	  in	  order	  to	  better	  serve	  local	  recovery	  needs	  and	  build	  trust	  between	  government	  and	  vulnerability	  communities.	  This	  development	  of	  relationships	  could	  also	  help	  to	  encourage	  local	  institutions	  to	  take	  a	  more	  proactive	  role	  in	  disaster	  preparedness.	  	  	   In	  general,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  disaster	  recovery	  should	  be	  shifted	  towards	  the	  state	  and	  local	  governments	  to	  help	  alleviate	  turf	  wars	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  and	  better	  prepare	  everyone	  for	  increasingly	  complex	  environmental	  threats.	  This	  could	  include	  the	  States’	  development	  of	  programs	  like	  Public	  Assistance	  so	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  large	  natural	  disaster,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  effectively	  and	  efficiently	  respond	  to	  their	  citizens	  who	  are	  in	  need.	  Obviously,	  there	  are	  certain	  limitations	  in	  the	  capacities	  of	  State	  governments	  to	  handle	  these	  disasters	  alone,	  but	  the	  federal	  government	  should	  develop	  incentives	  for	  the	  States	  to	  take	  a	  more	  proactive	  role	  in	  preparation	  and	  mitigation	  to	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Print	  Version	  of	  Survey	  	  1.	  Please	  enter	  the	  name	  of	  your	  county	  and	  state.	  	  2.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  weeks	  and	  months	  following	  Hurricane(s)	  Katrina,	  Rita,	  and/or	  Wilma	  (whichever	  affected	  your	  county),	  please	  rate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  following	  recovery	  activity	  categories	  were	  prioritized	  from	  1	  to	  5	  with	  1	  being	  a	  very	  low	  priority	  and	  5	  being	  a	  very	  high	  priority:	  Housing-­‐	  providing	  temporary	  housing	  solutions	  Debris/Infrastructure-­‐	  debris	  removal,	  plan	  immediate	  repair	  and	  restoration	  Business-­‐	  reestablishment	  of	  business	  Emotional/Psychological-­‐	  support	  networks	  Public	  Health	  &	  Health	  Care-­‐	  continuity	  of	  care	  through	  temporary	  facilities	  Mitigation	  Activities-­‐	  inform	  community	  members	  of	  opportunities	  to	  build	  back	  stronger	  	  3.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  months	  and	  years	  following	  Hurricane(s)	  Katrina,	  Rita,	  and/or	  Wilma	  (whichever	  affected	  your	  county),	  please	  rate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  following	  recovery	  activity	  categories	  were	  prioritized	  from	  1	  to	  5	  with	  1	  being	  a	  very	  low	  priority	  and	  5	  being	  a	  very	  high	  priority:	  Housing-­‐	  develop	  permanent	  housing	  solutions	  Infrastructure-­‐	  rebuild	  infrastructure	  to	  meet	  future	  community	  needs	  Business-­‐	  implement	  economic	  revitalization	  strategies,	  facilitate	  funding	  to	  business	  rebuilding	  Emotional	  Psychological-­‐	  ongoing	  counseling,	  behavioral	  health	  services	  Public	  Health	  and	  Health	  Care-­‐	  reestablishment	  of	  disrupted	  health	  care	  facilities	  Mitigation	  Activities-­‐	  implement	  mitigation	  strategies	  	  4.	  Overall,	  in	  terms	  of	  activities	  during	  the	  immediate	  and	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  processes	  following	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season,	  which	  were	  more	  successfully	  recovered?	  Immediate	  recovery	  activities	  	  or	  	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  activities	  	  5.	  During	  the	  recovery	  process	  following	  the	  2005	  hurricane	  season,	  which	  of	  the	  following	  issues	  did	  your	  county	  administrators	  experience?	  (or	  say:	  to	  what	  degree	  did	  this	  issue	  hinder	  your	  county’s	  ability	  to	  successfully	  recover)	  -­‐Matching	  funds	  for	  FEMA	  Public	  Assistance	  program	  projects	  -­‐Getting	  projects	  initiated	  and/or	  funded	  by	  FEMA	  due	  to	  the	  project	  costs	  being	  initially	  underestimated	  -­‐Getting	  firm	  commitments	  from	  FEMA	  regarding	  project	  eligibility	  -­‐Delays	  in	  projects	  due	  to	  the	  high	  turnover	  rate	  of	  FEMA	  staff	  -­‐A	  lack	  of	  local	  staff	  	  6.	  Thank	  you	  for	  your	  time.	  Please	  enter	  any	  additional	  comments	  you	  may	  have	  below.	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Open	  Ended	  Comments	  from	  Survey	  (unedited)	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APPENDIX	  B:	  VARIABLES	  
STATE	   COUNTY	   PERCAPFEMA	   PERSVRDAM	   POPSQMILE	   CONGRESS	   MSA	   PERPOV	   PCTMOBILE	   AGE	  
Florida	   Brevard	   30.90	   0.1	   467.8	   3	   1	   28.01	   5.06	   41.4	  
Florida	   Broward	   299.96	   1.3	   1346.9	   3	   1	   25.51	   1.65	   37.8	  
Florida	   Collier	   305.69	   0.5	   124.1	   3	   1	   28.57	   4.29	   44.1	  
Florida	   Glades	   109.60	   2.3	   13.7	   3	   0	   26.51	   30.07	   40.2	  
Florida	   Hendry	   137.47	   5.6	   31.4	   3	   0	   22.92	   14.68	   29.5	  
Florida	   Highlands	   5.51	   0	   85	   3	   0	   29.78	   15.44	   50	  
Florida	   Indian	  River	   28.14	   0.1	   224.5	   3	   1	   29.13	   6.01	   47	  
Florida	   Lee	   58.00	   0.1	   548.4	   3	   1	   29.13	   8.64	   45.2	  
Florida	   Martin	   119.51	   0.3	   227.9	   3	   1	   28.80	   6.02	   47.3	  
Florida	   Miami-­‐Dade	   250.57	   0.6	   1157.9	   3	   1	   24.52	   0.68	   35.6	  
	  Florida	  	   Monroe	   881.38	   11.3	   79.8	   3	   0	   25.96	   12.33	   42.6	  
Florida	   Okeechobee	   26.05	   0.9	   46.4	   3	   0	   25.53	   21.25	   36.7	  
Florida	   Palm	  Beach	   208.91	   0.9	   573	   3	   1	   27.05	   1.78	   41.8	  
Florida	   St.	  Lucie	   87.47	   0.3	   336.9	   3	   1	   28.18	   6.02	   42	  
Louisiana	   Acadia	   62.07	   2.4	   89.9	   1	   0	   26.78	   6.49	   33.7	  
Louisiana	   Allen	   79.90	   2.4	   33.3	   1	   0	   23.68	   6.54	   34.8	  
Louisiana	   Ascension	   37.51	   0.5	   262.4	   1	   1	   27.41	   9.39	   32	  
Louisiana	   Assumption	   39.14	   1.9	   69	   1	   0	   26.82	   12.54	   34.2	  
Louisiana	   Beauregard	   61.96	   4.2	   28.4	   1	   0	   27.57	   11.75	   35.5	  
Louisiana	   Calcasieu	   511.10	   9.3	   171.4	   1	   1	   26.83	   7.47	   34.5	  
Louisiana	   Cameron	   16691.08	   71.8	   7.6	   1	   1	   27.05	   15.85	   35	  
Louisiana	   E.	  Baton	  
Rouge	  
3772.51	   0.2	   907.4	   1	   1	   25.03	   1.39	   31.5	  
Louisiana	   E.	  Feliciana	   73182.24	   0.6	   47.2	   1	   1	   23.69	   10.78	   35.8	  
Louisiana	   Evangeline	   52.24	   0.4	   53.4	   1	   0	   26.14	   5.09	   33.7	  
Louisiana	   Iberia	   192.16	   5	   127.4	   1	   0	   26.10	   8.09	   33.3	  
Louisiana	   Iberville	   65.41	   0.7	   53.8	   1	   1	   24.09	   8.00	   34.4	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STATE	   COUNTY	   PERCAPFEMA	   PERSVRDAM	   POPSQMILE	   CONGRESS	   MSA	   PERPOV	   PCTMOBILE	   AGE	  
Louisiana	   Jefferson	   1067.36	   19.5	   1483.6	   1	   1	   26.53	   0.77	   35.9	  
Louisiana	   Jefferson	  
Davis	  
119.98	   4.1	   48.2	   1	   0	   27.40	   6.71	   34.5	  
Louisiana	   Lafayette	   66.26	   0.2	   705.6	   1	   1	   25.78	   4.92	   32.4	  
Louisiana	   Lafourche	   269.91	   1.7	   82.9	   1	   1	   27.14	   6.92	   34.1	  
Louisiana	   Livingston	   54.09	   1.1	   141.7	   1	   1	   27.95	   12.63	   32.8	  
Louisiana	   Orleans	   5594.04	   55.9	   2677.8	   1	   1	   23.51	   0.15	   33.1	  
Louisiana	   Plaquemines	   29086.21	   57.5	   31.7	   1	   1	   26.11	   12.34	   33.7	  
Louisiana	   Pointe	  
Coupee	  
30.11	   0.2	   40.9	   1	   1	   27.31	   9.81	   36.7	  
Louisiana	   Rapides	   31.90	   0	   95.5	   1	   1	   26.39	   5.61	   35.5	  
Louisiana	   Sabine	   14.42	   0.5	   27.1	   1	   0	   28.30	   24.72	   38.2	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Bernard	   23900.26	   78.4	   144.6	   1	   1	   27.31	   3.14	   36.6	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Charles	   413.85	   2.4	   169.3	   1	   1	   27.42	   3.97	   34.2	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Helena	   90.45	   2	   25.8	   1	   1	   26.34	   17.59	   35	  
Louisiana	   St.	  James	   129.87	   1.2	   86.2	   1	   0	   26.23	   7.48	   34	  
Louisiana	   St.	  John	  the	  
Baptist	  
87.90	   1.9	   196.5	   1	   1	   26.36	   4.55	   32	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Landry	   24.85	   0.3	   94.4	   1	   0	   26.64	   7.14	   34.6	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Martin	   17.77	   0.6	   65.7	   1	   1	   26.71	   11.24	   33.4	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Mary	   95.71	   1.6	   87.3	   1	   0	   26.34	   8.66	   34.3	  
Louisiana	   St.	  Tammany	   2164.98	   25.5	   224	   1	   1	   27.69	   4.51	   36.3	  
Louisiana	   Tangipahoa	   166.88	   2.3	   127.3	   1	   0	   25.74	   9.70	   32.3	  
Louisiana	   Terrebonne	   99.73	   6.7	   83.3	   1	   1	   26.29	   6.72	   33	  
Louisiana	   Vermilion	   876.60	   13	   45.8	   1	   0	   26.97	   8.53	   35.1	  
Louisiana	   Vernon	   39.43	   1.3	   39.6	   1	   0	   26.42	   9.03	   28.3	  
Louisiana	   Washington	   2717.30	   8.4	   65.6	   1	   0	   26.56	   8.08	   36.1	  
Louisiana	   W.	  Baton	  	   50.81	   0.2	   113.1	   1	   1	   26.69	   9.73	   34	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STATE	   COUNTY	   PERCAPFEMA	   PERSVRDAM	   POPSQMILE	   CONGRESS	   MSA	   PERPOV	   PCTMOBILE	   AGE	  
Louisiana	   W.	  Feliciana	   27.82	   0.1	   37.2	   1	   1	   18.02	   7.54	   36.6	  
Mississippi	   Adams	   10.44	   0.3	   74.7	   2	   0	   27.64	   4.70	   38.1	  
Mississippi	   Amite	   12.58	   0.3	   18.6	   2	   0	   28.64	   13.82	   38.3	  
Mississippi	   Attala	   11.54	   0.1	   26.7	   2	   0	   27.55	   8.64	   37.3	  
Mississippi	   Choctaw	   19.18	   0.2	   23.3	   2	   0	   27.18	   8.33	   36.9	  
Mississippi	   Claiborne	   57.17	   0.6	   24.3	   2	   0	   21.55	   10.75	   25.6	  
Mississippi	   Clarke	   52.15	   1.7	   26	   2	   0	   28.07	   12.52	   36.8	  
Mississippi	   Copiah	   27.72	   0.6	   37	   2	   1	   26.37	   8.65	   34	  
Mississippi	   Covington	   192.57	   2.6	   46.9	   2	   0	   27.43	   12.66	   33.8	  
Mississippi	   Forrest	   256.52	   4.1	   155.5	   2	   1	   24.08	   4.20	   29.7	  
Mississippi	   Franklin	   8.94	   0.2	   15	   2	   0	   27.92	   13.57	   37	  
Mississippi	   George	   130.39	   6.5	   40.1	   2	   1	   27.84	   9.73	   33.3	  
Mississippi	   Greene	   1216.42	   3.4	   18.7	   2	   0	   23.70	   11.50	   32.4	  
Mississippi	   Hancock	   12737.00	   69.8	   90.1	   2	   1	   27.65	   9.20	   38.5	  
Mississippi	   Harrison	   6110.78	   34.2	   326.3	   2	   1	   25.83	   5.19	   33.9	  
Mississippi	   Hinds	   34.66	   0.3	   288.6	   2	   1	   25.05	   1.58	   31.9	  
Mississippi	   Holmes	   20.09	   0.3	   28.6	   2	   0	   24.54	   10.48	   29.7	  
Mississippi	   Humphreys	   36.51	   0.2	   26.8	   2	   0	   24.75	   4.59	   30.5	  
Mississippi	   Jackson	   2044.99	   34.2	   180.8	   2	   1	   27.33	   5.00	   34.7	  
Mississippi	   Jasper	   609.46	   4.4	   26.8	   2	   0	   27.68	   11.81	   35.1	  
Mississippi	   Jefferson	   6.88	   1.1	   18.8	   2	   0	   23.85	   12.91	   32.4	  
Mississippi	   jefferson	  
Davis	  
318.28	   1.4	   34.2	   2	   0	   27.00	   9.46	   35	  
Mississippi	   Jones	   640.61	   4.1	   93.6	   2	   0	   27.19	   8.63	   35.8	  
Mississippi	   Kemper	   17.12	   0.6	   13.6	   2	   0	   26.89	   11.39	   35.2	  
Mississippi	   Lamar	   69.16	   5.2	   78.6	   2	   1	   27.43	   6.29	   32.6	  
Mississippi	   Lauderdale	   103.58	   0.9	   111	   2	   0	   26.46	   6.64	   35	  
Mississippi	   Lawrence	   286.09	   2.3	   30.8	   2	   0	   28.56	   10.66	   35.8	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STATE	   COUNTY	   PERCAPFEMA	   PERSVRDAM	   POPSQMILE	   CONGRESS	   MSA	   PERPOV	   PCTMOBILE	   AGE	  
Mississippi	   Leake	   8.41	   0.1	   35.9	   2	   0	   26.84	   8.72	   34.8	  
Mississippi	   Lincoln	   21.57	   0.9	   56.6	   2	   0	   27.62	   10.03	   35.8	  
Mississippi	   Lowndes	   13.80	   0.1	   122.7	   2	   0	   26.77	   5.73	   32.7	  
Mississippi	   Madison	   51.18	   0.1	   104.1	   2	   1	   26.14	   2.87	   33.4	  
Mississippi	   Marion	   601.34	   3.4	   47.2	   2	   0	   27.30	   8.11	   35.1	  
Mississippi	   Neshoba	   57.14	   0.2	   50.3	   2	   0	   27.33	   9.09	   34.7	  
Mississippi	   Newton	   35.55	   0.9	   37.8	   2	   0	   27.58	   9.85	   35.1	  
Mississippi	   Noxubee	   16.49	   0.5	   18.1	   2	   0	   25.70	   11.61	   32.3	  
Mississippi	   Oktibbeha	   7.88	   0.2	   93.7	   2	   0	   21.91	   6.70	   24.8	  
Mississippi	   Pearl	  River	   2180.09	   8.2	   60	   2	   0	   28.23	   10.08	   35.9	  
Mississippi	   Perry	   59.23	   3.8	   18.8	   2	   1	   27.78	   13.63	   33.5	  
Mississippi	   Pike	   67.28	   1	   95.2	   2	   0	   27.23	   8.48	   35.2	  
Mississippi	   Rankin	   38.74	   0.3	   148.8	   2	   1	   27.16	   7.65	   34.6	  
Mississippi	   Scott	   30.33	   0.5	   46.7	   2	   0	   26.82	   11.12	   33.8	  
Mississippi	   Simpson	   164.01	   1.1	   46.9	   2	   1	   27.11	   11.14	   35	  
Mississippi	   Smith	   80.48	   0.7	   25.4	   2	   0	   28.67	   12.51	   35.6	  
Mississippi	   Stone	   2528.24	   11.2	   30.6	   2	   1	   26.80	   8.86	   33.6	  
Mississippi	   Walthall	   157.50	   5.1	   37.5	   2	   0	   27.27	   11.16	   35.1	  
Mississippi	   Warren	   10.90	   0.2	   84.6	   2	   0	   26.85	   6.71	   34.8	  
Mississippi	   Wayne	   1251.03	   2.6	   26.2	   2	   0	   28.09	   14.06	   33.8	  
Mississippi	   Wilkinson	   26.82	   0.4	   15.2	   2	   0	   24.58	   17.22	   35	  
Mississippi	   Winston	   18.57	   0.2	   33.2	   2	   0	   27.34	   6.71	   36.3	  
Mississippi	   Yazoo	   15.22	   0.2	   30.6	   2	   0	   23.79	   6.59	   33.7	  
Alabama	   Baldwin	   198.85	   0.5	   88	   2	   1	   28.87	   9.35	   39	  
Alabama	   Choctaw	   17.13	   0.3	   17.4	   2	   0	   28.57	   16.84	   37.9	  
Alabama	   Clarke	   13.43	   0.6	   22.5	   2	   0	   27.97	   13.00	   35.5	  
Alabama	   Greene	   19.84	   0.2	   15.4	   2	   1	   26.96	   16.33	   35.9	  
Alabama	   Hale	   4.14	   0.1	   26.7	   2	   1	   27.06	   16.09	   34.4	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Alabama	   Marengo	   10.24	   0.1	   23.1	   2	   0	   28.12	   12.52	   36.4	  
Alabama	   Mobile	   57.50	   2.1	   324.3	   2	   1	   26.85	   3.85	   34.4	  
Alabama	   Pickens	   11.15	   0.2	   23.8	   2	   0	   27.99	   12.60	   36.9	  
Alabama	   Sumter	   15.11	   0.3	   16.4	   2	   0	   24.85	   15.70	   32.1	  
Alabama	   Tuscaloosa	   10.23	   0	   124.5	   2	   1	   25.54	   6.21	   31.9	  
Alabama	   Washington	   39.49	   1.1	   16.7	   2	   0	   28.03	   13.81	   34.9	  
Alabama	   Wilcox	   1.32	   0	   14.8	   2	   0	   25.80	   18.63	   33.8	  
Texas	   Angelina	   28.88	   0.6	   99.9	   5	   0	   26.67	   8.33	   34.2	  
Texas	   Brazoria	   8.45	   0	   174.4	   5	   1	   26.27	   5.66	   34	  
Texas	   Chambers	   77.72	   1.4	   43.5	   5	   1	   27.74	   9.65	   35.1	  
Texas	   Fort	  Bend	   1.84	   0	   405.1	   5	   1	   26.47	   1.71	   33.3	  
Texas	   Galveston	   28.15	   0.2	   628.5	   5	   1	   26.58	   2.66	   35.9	  
Texas	   Hardin	   440.12	   7	   53.8	   5	   1	   28.69	   12.20	   36	  
Texas	   Harris	   5.45	   0	   1966.8	   5	   1	   24.72	   1.15	   31.2	  
Texas	   Houston	   2.34	   0	   18.8	   5	   0	   24.96	   9.34	   40.3	  
Texas	   Jasper	   265.10	   6.7	   38	   5	   0	   28.06	   12.41	   37.3	  
Texas	   Jefferson	   343.23	   4.9	   278.8	   5	   1	   25.53	   1.42	   35.3	  
Texas	   Liberty	   46.53	   1.8	   60.5	   5	   1	   25.57	   12.14	   34	  
Texas	   Montgomery	   11.84	   0.1	   281.4	   5	   1	   27.48	   7.64	   34.4	  
Texas	   Nacodgoches	   14.02	   0.2	   62.5	   5	   0	   23.93	   8.68	   29.7	  
Texas	   Newton	   171.91	   6.6	   16.2	   5	   0	   27.42	   14.23	   36.9	  
Texas	   Orange	   72.33	   7.9	   238.7	   5	   1	   28.14	   8.05	   36.1	  
Texas	   Polk	   34.44	   1.9	   38.9	   5	   0	   26.89	   14.82	   39.3	  
Texas	   Sabine	   65.36	   1.4	   21.4	   5	   0	   30.31	   28.81	   47	  
Texas	   San	  
Augustine	  
170.25	   0.6	   16.9	   5	   0	   28.99	   17.09	   42.1	  
Texas	   San	  Jacinto	   19.75	   1.6	   39	   5	   1	   28.98	   16.54	   40	  
Texas	   Shelby	   23.53	   0.2	   31.8	   5	   0	   27.66	   14.47	   36.9	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Texas	   Trinity	   11.35	   0.4	   19.9	   5	   0	   29.36	   21.42	   43.3	  
Texas	   Tyler	   1541.92	   8.5	   22.6	   5	   0	   27.25	   12.35	   38.9	  
Texas	   Walker	   5.03	   0.2	   78.5	   5	   0	   18.67	   8.32	   31	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VITA	  Camille	  Golden	  was	  born	  in	  1988	  and	  grew	  up	  in	  Jackson,	  Mississippi.	  As	  an	  adolescent,	  she	  was	  always	  interested	  in	  science	  and	  environmental	  issues.	  In	  the	  5th	  grade,	  Camille	  started	  an	  environmental	  club	  and	  was	  recognized	  by	  the	  Millennium	  Dreamers	  Program	  at	  Walt	  Disney	  World.	  After	  graduating	  from	  Ridgeland	  High	  School	  in	  2007,	  Camille	  continued	  her	  education	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Mississippi	  in	  Oxford,	  Mississippi	  where	  she	  received	  a	  Bachelor	  of	  Science	  in	  Geology	  and	  graduated	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2011.	  That	  fall,	  she	  came	  to	  LSU	  to	  pursue	  her	  Master’s	  degree	  in	  Environmental	  Science.	  While	  at	  LSU,	  Camille	  has	  participated	  in	  the	  Coast	  and	  Environment	  Graduate	  Organization	  and	  the	  Environmentors	  Program.	  Upon	  graduation,	  Camille	  hopes	  to	  begin	  a	  career	  in	  the	  Environmental	  Consulting	  industry.	  	  
